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Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District #11 has been extensively analyzed as 
the latest step in the Court’s long struggle with the desegregation of 
public schools. Because the trend in recent years has been to 
emphasize the importance of context in equal protection cases, and 
because school desegregation has tremendous social and historical 
importance, reaction to Parents Involved has been focused largely on 
its impact on desegregation efforts.2 Context, however, while 
important, is not everything. Just as “[t]here is only one Equal 
Protection Clause,”3 there is really only one doctrinal structure for 
equal protection cases. Doctrinal shifts and innovations in one 
context carry over into others.4 
                                               
1
 551 U.S. 701 (2007). Parents Involved struck down voluntary plans for racial 
integration in school districts in Seattle and Louisville. In Louisville, the voluntary 
plan was a continuation of court-ordered desegregation plans that had been in 
effect from 1975 until 2000. Id. at 715-16. Seattle had never been subjected to a 
desegregation order but had begun voluntary measures in 1963 and expanded on 
them in part to settle desegregation lawsuits. Id. at 712; id.  at 807-13 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
2
 See, e.g., Ronald Turner, The Voluntary School Integration Cases and the 
Contextual Equal Protection Clause, 51 HOW. L.J. 251, 252 (2008) (quoting 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (“Context matters when reviewing 
race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”)); Leslie 
Yalof Garfield, The Glass Half Full: Envisioning the Future of Race Preference 
Policies, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AMER. L. 385 (2008); Michael J. Kaufman, PICS 
in Focus: A Majority of the Supreme Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of 
Race-Conscious School Integration Strategies, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 
(2007); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 131 (2007); but see Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: 
Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes 
from the First Full Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1387 (2008) 
(“Justice Kennedy in concurrence seemed to be moving the doctrine governing 
race-conscious efforts at integrating educational institutions towards other bodies 
of equal protection law.”). 
3
 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
4
 See generally Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1789 (2008) (describing the ways in which race and sex cases have 
influenced each other). 
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The Parents Involved decision was an important battle in a 
larger war over interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. At 
stake is not just whether states may strive to integrate their schools 
but whether states may strive for racial equality at all, or whether the 
Constitution effectively enacts the status quo of racial hierarchy, 
protected from any conscious governmental effort to change it. The 
outcome of that struggle also necessarily affects whether the 
government can properly seek to ameliorate gender hierarchy as 
well. 
This Article uses the term contingent equal protection to 
describe the constitutional analysis that applies to a range of 
government efforts to ameliorate those hierarchies. “Contingent” 
refers to the fact that the equal protection analysis is contingent upon 
the existence of structural, de facto inequality. Contingent equal 
protection cases include those that involve explicit race and sex 
classifications; facially neutral efforts to reduce inequality; and 
accommodation of sex differences to promote equality. Uniting all 
three kinds of cases under a single conceptual umbrella reveals the 
implications that developments in one area can have for the other 
two. 
Despite the state action doctrine, which prevents courts from 
insisting that states redress inequality, 5 the Supreme Court has 
allowed states to redress structural inequality if they choose to do so. 
The term structural inequality is broad and is in a rough sense the 
inverse of the state action doctrine. That is, structural inequality 
refers to existing conditions of inequality that are not directly 
attributable to a specific past act of governmental discrimination that 
would give rise to a right to race-conscious relief under the Equal 
Protection Clause. It includes “the institutional defaults, established 
                                               
5
 The Supreme Court tried to synthesize the state action doctrine in Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 615 (1991). According to that opinion, state 
action exists when (1) the claimed deprivation results from the exercise of a right 
or privilege having its source in state authority and (2) the defendant can be 
described in all fairness as a state actor. Id. at 620. Relevant to the latter question 
are the extent of reliance on governmental assistance, performance of traditional 
governmental functions, and any unique aggravation of the injury by the incidents 
of governmental authority. Id. at 621-22. 
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structures, and social or political norms that may appear to be … 
neutral, non-individual focused, and otherwise rational, but that 
taken together create and reinforce” segregation and inequality.7 
Whether the government has a compelling interest in 
eliminating structural inequality was the key issue that divided the 
Court in Parents Involved.8 In contingent equal protection cases, the 
state interest in equality can suspend otherwise-applicable doctrine 
that would condemn race- or sex-conscious policies. The modifier 
“contingent” reflects the fact that the suspension of otherwise-
applicable rules lasts only so long as the Court acknowledges the 
continuing existence of inequality. Contingent equal protection is 
thus the last vestige of the anti-subordination interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, an interpretation the Supreme Court has 
largely declined to enforce but has at least permitted Congress and 
the states to pursue.9 Because contingent equal protection is still 
possible, the Court has not (yet) constitutionalized the status quo by 
forbidding race-conscious or sex-conscious state action intended to 
promote equality. 
The “yet” is important. Contingent equal protection is under 
attack—and with it, the state’s ability to pursue the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s anti-subordination agenda. In Parents Involved, the 
Court came within one vote of holding that there is no compelling 
                                               
7
 Erica Frankenberg and Chinh Q. Le, The Post-Parents Involved Challenge: 
Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1016 
(2008) (defining the “now well-accepted phenomenon of ‘structural inequality’ or 
‘structural racism’ as theorized by Andrew Grant-Thomas & john a. powell, 
Structural Racism and Color Lines in The United States, in TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY COLOR LINES: MULTIRACIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 
(Andrew Grant-Thomas & Gary Orfield eds., Temple University Press) (2008), 
and Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in 
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843 (1994). 
8
 See Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 505 U.S. 
701, 725-33 (plurality opinion) (discussing the state interests); id. at 787-90 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining why 
he did not join the plurality’s discussion of the state interests). 
9
 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
107 (1976) (setting out the now-classic distinction between the anti-classification 
and anti-subordination interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause). 
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state interest in ameliorating de facto racial segregation. Such a 
holding, combined with aggressive application of disparate impact 
doctrine, would effectively forbid states or the federal government 
from adopting policies designed to reduce segregation and structural 
race inequality. For example, in Ricci v. DeStefano,10 Justice Scalia 
wrote a concurrence to present the case—based on this line of 
reasoning—that the disparate impact provisions of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 196411 are unconstitutional.12 Furthermore, 
because contingent equal protection also flourishes in sex 
classification cases, its elimination would threaten measures such as 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act13 and Family and Medical Leave 
Act14 designed to promote sex equality. 
This threat to remedial legislation like Title VII and the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act exploits a point of confusion in equal 
protection doctrine. Part I of this Article introduces the framework of 
contingent equal protection and shows how it has operated in cases 
involving racial classifications. It shows that the Supreme Court has 
implicitly recognized the compelling state interest in counteracting 
structural inequality. Cases that appear to suggest the contrary are in 
fact based on the Court’s aversion to government-sponsored racial 
classifications of individuals. Part II extends the concept of 
contingent equal protection to encompass sex equality cases, 
including the cases known as the “real differences” cases, in which 
the Court sees not inequality but natural sex differences. In this 
context, the Court is not averse to classifications per se. The sex 
cases thus demonstrate that the problem in equal protection doctrine 
is not whether structural inequality is a compelling state interest—it 
is—but the means that states can use to pursue that interest. The 
attempts by the Parents Involved plurality and by Justice Scalia in 
Ricci to deny the state interest in structural inequality are thus 
contrary to precedent as well as to the anti-subordination function of 
the Fourteenth Amendment itself. 
                                               
10
 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009). 
11
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). 
12
 See Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2681-83 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
13
 42 U.S.C. § 2500e(k). 
14
 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54. 
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Part III extends some of the insights generated by analyzing the 
race and sex cases together through the framework of contingent 
equal protection. Part III.A sketches the implications that the Parents 
Involved plurality opinion would have for the range of cases that fall 
under the rubric of contingent equal protection, starkly limiting the 
state’s ability even to choose amelioration of inequality and 
effectively constitutionalizing the status quo. Part III.B suggests the 
possibilities of the alternative path, using contingent equal protection 
to define the scope of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment and to support a positive right to substantive equality in 
some contexts. 
I. Contingent Equal Protection and Racial Inequality 
In Parents Involved, five members of the Supreme Court 
recognized, in separate opinions, that the amelioration of structural 
inequality is a compelling state interest in at least some contexts.15 
The four Justices in the plurality concluded the opposite.16 The 
plurality’s view would effectively constitutionalize the status quo of 
inequality by prohibiting the state from acting with a conscious 
purpose to redress it.17 
                                               
15
 Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 505 U.S. 701, 
803 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 787-88, 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
16
 See infra, notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality opinion). 
17
 A legal rule “constitutionalizes” the status quo when it treats existing 
circumstances as both natural and constitutionally immune from legislative 
modification. This idea derives from the perception that the early twentieth-century 
Supreme Court constitutionalized “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.” Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Jeffrey M. 
Shaman (“By constitutionalizing common law categories and natural law concepts, 
the Court froze the status quo, blocking the way for legislation that altered the 
orthodox relationship of employer and employee.”). When the Court treats existing 
hierarchies based on race and gender as natural and attempts to alter them as 
unconstitutional race or sex classifications, it constitutionalizes those hierarchies. 
See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 HOW. L.J. 611, 636 (2007 (“[B]y 
reading the Constitution to require prospective neutrality in the vast majority of 
future allocation programs, the Court precludes political actors from adopting 
strategies that might eventually equalize the allocation of resources. In short, the 
Supreme Court has constitutionalized existing racial inequalities, and it has done 
so in the name of promoting equality.”); Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 
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Perhaps surprisingly, the latter view follows fairly naturally 
from the Court’s recent precedent on racial classifications. Justice 
Kennedy, despite having joined the majority opinions in most of 
those prior cases, balked at the next step in Parents Involved.18 His 
separate concurrence indicated how he would create a stopping point 
in the Court’s march away from contingent equal protection, towards 
absolute constitutional colorblindness that would prevent 
government from even aspiring to racial equality. 
This Part explains how equal protection doctrine arrived at a 
point where a plurality of the Supreme Court could plausibly 
repudiate the compelling state interest in equality. It also evaluates 
Justice Kennedy’s stopping point. Part I.A describes the corner the 
Court has painted itself into between contingent equal protection and 
disparate impact doctrine. Disparate impact doctrine generally 
forbids even race-neutral government action intended to have a 
racially disparate effect.19 To survive equal protection review, 
therefore, such action needs to be supported by a compelling state 
interest.20 Justice Kennedy and others have suggested that race-
neutral policies meant to promote racial equality could somehow 
avoid strict scrutiny entirely.21 Part I.A concludes that such a strategy 
is neither a plausible doctrinal development nor necessarily 
desirable. The better route is to recognize the state’s compelling 
interest in reducing structural inequality and to evaluate it using the 
developing form of strict scrutiny that is not fatal in fact. 
                                                                                                            
HARV. L. REV. 10, 54-55 (explaining the implicit assumption that the status quo is 
neutral, so that governmental actions to change it “have a different status than 
omissions,” and quoting Aviam Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 
OHIO ST. L.J. 383, 409 (1981) (“To settle for the constitutionalization of the status 
quo is to bequeath a petrified forest.”)). 
18
 See Parents Involved, 505 U.S. at 787-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (rejecting this aspect of the majority opinion). 
19
 See Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976), discussed infra, notes ___ and 
accompanying text. 
20
 See infra, note 34. 
21
 See Parents Involved, 505 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 837 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Kathleen 
Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1048-49, 1054 (1998). 
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Part I.B discusses the implicit prerequisite for that strict scrutiny 
analysis: the compelling state interest in eliminating structural 
inequality. Affirmative action cases have traditionally rejected a state 
interest in remedies for “societal discrimination.”22 Part I.B argues, 
however, that the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized an 
interest in promoting equality, although pursuit of that interest is 
limited by the Court’s aversion to racial classifications of 
individuals. 
A. Structural Inequality and Facially Neutral State Action 
When the Supreme Court strikes down benign or remedial racial 
classifications such as an affirmative action program, it often holds 
out the alternative of race-neutral strategies for meeting the state’s 
goals.23 Facially neutral polices that are designed to increase racial 
diversity are sometimes called race-neutral affirmative action or 
alternative action.24 These strategies raise their own set of 
constitutional questions. Kim Forde-Mazrui first pointed out that 
alternative action plans would be vulnerable under the Court’s 
disparate impact doctrine,25 which prohibits facially neutral state 
action that is merely a mask for a racial classification or motive.26 
The equal protection landscape has changed somewhat since Forde-
                                               
22
 See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 438 U.S. 265, 307 (Powell, J., 
announcing judgment); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 
(1995); see also infra, Part I.B.1. 
23
 See Parents Involved, 505 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (proposing site selection, design of attendance zones, 
resource allocation, and recruitment of faculty and students). Race-neutral methods 
are not necessarily available or effective to integrate many school districts. See 
Ryan, supra note 2 at 138-39, 144-49 (assessing impact and remaining alternatives 
after Parents Involved and noting, for example, the much existing segregation is 
between rather than within school districts). 
24
 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral 
Affirmative Action, 88 GEORGETOWN L.J. 2331, 2332, 2335 (2001). 
25
 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24. 
26
 See Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (establishing that disparate impact in 
the absence of discriminatory motive does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); 
Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (clarifying the high 
standard for intent under the doctrine); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Housing Develop. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (setting out framework for disparate 
impact claims, discussed infra). 
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Mazrui first identified this problem, but if the “reactionary 
colorblindness”27 of the Parents Involved plurality prevails, even 
alternative action could be found unconstitutional. 
1. Race-Neutral Affirmative Action 
As the federal courts and many states have restricted the use of 
traditional affirmative action, institutions have developed alternative, 
race-neutral means for increasing diversity and providing equal 
opportunities. Perhaps the most well-known is the Texas Ten Percent 
Plan, which guarantees admission to any public college for students 
in the top ten percent of any Texas high school’s graduating class.28 
At the K-12 level, school districts have experimented with income-
based instead of race-based busing.29 Schools, employers, and 
governments bidding out contracts have expanded recruitment efforts 
to target minority applicants.30 These programs seek to ameliorate 
racial inequality and de facto segregation without facially classifying 
individuals by race.31 
                                               
27
 See Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and 
Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) (describing and 
analyzing the development of the ideology that the author terms reactionary 
colorblindness). 
28
 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (Vernon 2007). The Texas plan was adopted 
in response to the Fifth Circuit’s pre-Grutter decision that affirmative action was 
unconstitutional. Hopwood v. Tx., 78 F.3d 932, 962 (1996). 
29
 See Evan Osnos, Schools Find New Route to Diversity; New Integration Plans 
Use Income to Place Pupils, CHI. TRIB. Jan. 28, 2002, § N, at 7. 
30
 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 929-32 (1996) (describing self-study, outreach, and 
counseling as methods for increasing diversity in schools and workplaces); 
Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 1395, 
1401-07 (describing a range of facially neutral but race-conscious measures to 
increase diversity in government programs, businesses, and schools). 
31
 Whether the plans are effective for this purpose or are unacceptable for other 
reasons remains open. See, e.g., Marta Tienda & Sunny Xinchun Niu, Capitalizing 
on Segregation, Pretending Neutrality: College Admissions and the Texas Top 
10% Law, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 312 (2006) (finding that Texas plan facilitated 
some minority enrollment in selective institutions but failed to sustain minority 
admissions rates at the flagship schools); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 
303 n. 10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that percentage plans depend on 
continued segregation in K-12 schools and encourage students to stay in low-
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The purpose of race-neutral affirmative action is to ameliorate 
de facto segregation and structural inequality. Although these 
measures are facially race-neutral, they are adopted with the hope 
that they will lead to greater racial diversity within institutions and 
equality across society. The purpose is thus to counteract structural 
inequality. 
2. Disparate Impact Doctrine and the Challenge to Race-
Neutral Affirmative Action 
To describe a state policy as designed to eliminate structural 
inequality is to suggest that it is manifestly consistent with the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Race-neutral affirmative action, however, 
can also be characterized as a facially neutral policy that has been 
adopted because of its racial impact.33 The latter characterization 
suggests that the policy is vulnerable under the Washington v. 
Davis34 line of cases that established disparate impact doctrine under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
In Washington v. Davis, African American applicants to the 
District of Columbia police department challenged “Test 21,” the 
employment-qualifications exam used by the police department to 
rank applicants. They demonstrated that the test had a racially 
disparate impact: white applicants scored better than black applicants 
at a statistically significant rate.35 The test had not been shown to 
predict job performance.36 The Supreme Court announced that the 
state’s indifference to this disparate impact did not constitute a 
                                                                                                            
performing schools and take easy courses). See also Robert J. Delahunty, 
“Constitutional Justice” or “Constitutional Peace”? The Supreme Court and 
Affirmative Action, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 37-41 (2008) (arguing that 
affirmative action is itself a conservative, privilege-preserving response to racial 
inequality). 
33
 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often 
requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make 
decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.”). 
34
 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
35
 Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976). 
36
 Id. 
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violation of the Equal Protection Clause.37 Instead, the plaintiffs 
could prevail only by showing that the police department had a 
discriminatory racial purpose when it adopted Test 21.38 
As the doctrine later developed in Village of Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,39 even proof of 
a discriminatory purpose is not necessarily enough to invalidate the 
state action. The plaintiff’s proof that a discriminatory purpose was a 
“motivating factor” in the adoption of Test 21 would merely shift the 
burden of proof to the state.40 The police department could still 
prevail if it could prove that it would have adopted Test 21 anyway, 
for legitimate reasons, regardless of any discriminatory motive that 
was also present.41 In other words, the state can prevail by refuting 
causation. Finally, once a racial motive and causation are established, 
the state’s action is subjected to strict scrutiny.42 
                                               
37
 Id. at 241-42 (discussing the required showing of discriminatory purpose); see 
also Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (explaining 
that “discriminatory purpose” under Washington v. Davis “implies more than intent 
as volition or intent as awareness of consequences”). 
38
 Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245. 
39
 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
40
 Id. at 270 and n. 21. The weight of this burden is demonstrated by Personnel 
Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), which rejected a sex 
discrimination challenge to a veterans’ preference in state hiring. The state had 
obviously known that the preference would benefit a class that was 
overwhelmingly male. Moreover, the state had taken that disparity into account by 
creating an exception for jobs that particularly “call for” a woman. Id. at 270 n. 22 
But because the state did not adopt the statute in order to harm women, there was 
no violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 279 (“‘Discriminatory purpose,’ 
however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of 
consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker … selected or reaffirmed a 
particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”). 
41
 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n. 21. 
42
 If the state fails to justify its policy under the Arlington Heights analysis, the 
Court’s precedents are unclear about what happens next. Does the policy fail equal 
protection analysis automatically, or is it subject to strict scrutiny? This point 
remains unclear because in most cases, either there is no explicitly racial motive or 
it is one that obviously would not pass strict scrutiny. At times, the Court has 
suggested that the disparate impact analysis is wholly separate from strict scrutiny 
review. See Wash. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484-85 and n. 28 
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For example, suppose that, having proven its point that it was 
not guilty of intentional race discrimination, the D.C. police 
department nonetheless regrets that its hiring practices result in a 
disproportionately white police force. It hires a consultant to design a 
“Test 22,” which must meet two requirements: first, the test must 
identify applicants likely to be good police officers as well as or 
better than Test 21; second, results on Test 22 must not have the 
disparate racial impact. The latter requirement means that African 
American applicants must do comparatively better, and white 
applicants comparatively worse, on Test 22 than on Test 21. The 
consultant succeeds in producing a Test 22, and the department 
adopts it. 
The department is now vulnerable to an equal protection claim 
by disappointed white applicants, using the doctrine of Washington 
v. Davis and Arlington Heights. Its action—replacing Test 21 with 
Test 22—will have a negative, disparate impact on white applicants, 
as compared to the status quo ante. The fact that the claim is one of 
“reverse” discrimination does not alter the analysis under the Equal 
                                                                                                            
(referring to strict scrutiny as the standard applicable to “explicit racial 
classifications” and as distinct from disparate impact analysis). However, in the 
voting rights and redistricting context, where the government frequently has a 
benign, remedial racial motive, the Court applies strict scrutiny. See Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to redistricting plan 
that intentional assigns voters to voting districts on the basis of race). The 
ambiguity in other contexts should be resolved by clearly incorporating strict 
scrutiny as the last step of the disparate impact analysis. Otherwise, proof of a 
racial motive will doom state policy even where the motive is benign, compelling, 
and consistent with the anti-subordination goals of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Instead of stopping with the Arlington Heights analysis, the Court should at least 
give race-neutral alternative action plans the opportunity to satisfy strict scrutiny. 
Prior cases dealing with facially neutral state action, as in Washington v. Davis, 
assumed that if there was an underlying racial motive, that motive was necessarily 
pernicious. The disparate impact doctrine was designed to screen out cases where 
there was no underlying racial intent. But the Court has never re-visited its 
disparate impact doctrine in a case involving an effort to eliminate rather than 
perpetuate subordination. Where the government is not hiding its racial motive, it 
should at least be given the opportunity to satisfy strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny 
analysis should be added as a fourth step in the Davis/Arlington Heights analysis in 
all cases, as has already been done in the redistricting cases. 
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Protection Clause.43 The plaintiffs can easily prove that the racial 
effect was a motivating factor.44 Indeed, it was the motive for 
developing the new test; for that reason the police department will 
not be able to make out the affirmative defense that it would have 
adopted Test 22 for reasons other than changing the racial makeup of 
its force.45 To preserve Test 22, the police department must show 
that it had a compelling state interest in a test designed to produce 
racial parity in results. 
The Supreme Court nearly confronted this scenario in Ricci v. 
DeStefano, in which the city of New Haven had rejected the results 
of a promotion exam because of a racially disparate impact.46 Two 
differences prevented Ricci from presenting a head-on conflict 
between the city’s effort to reduce structural inequality47 and the 
Court’s adherence to colorblindness as the dominant theory of equal 
protection: First, the Court was able to decide Ricci under Title VII, 
avoiding constitutional questions.48 Second, New Haven had thrown 
out its own “Test 21” after administering it to candidates and was 
sued before it had a chance to develop a “Test 22.”49 The majority 
opinion—writing by Justice Kennedy and joined by the Parents 
Involved plurality—concluded that this sequence of events made the 
city’s actions tantamount to an express racial classification of the 
individual test-takers.50 The city’s action was prompted by the 
known races of the particular people who passed and failed the test.51 
                                               
43
 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny 
to affirmative action program in higher education); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to minority set-aside 
program for federal contracting). 
44
 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 263-66 (discussing the “motivating factor” 
requirement). 
45
 See id. at 270 n. 21 (setting out the affirmative defense). 
46
 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009). 
47
 The dissent in Ricci described several reasons why the test results could 
reasonably be viewed as a manifestation of structural inequality. See id. at 2690-
91, 2693-94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
48
 See id. at 2664-65. 
49
 See id. at 2664. 
50
 See id. at 2673-74. 
51
 See id. 
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Justice Kennedy, acting on the same aversion to such classifications 
that he expressed in Parents Involved,52 interpreted Title VII to 
forbid the city to act on that basis.53 
Because of the unusual timing in Ricci, the decision does not 
preclude New Haven from finding a Test 22 for future use. The 
opinion, however, offers scant assurance that such action would be 
upheld. The majority offered bland assurance that employers have an 
unquestioned ability to “ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity 
to apply for promotions.”54 Conspicuously absent is any indication 
that an employer may treat a disparate impact as presumptive 
evidence of unfairness. The majority also expressly reserved the 
question whether the disparate impact rules in Title VII violate the 
Equal Protection Clause by requiring employers to take race into 
account.55 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia sent up a trial balloon on 
striking down the disparate impact rules.56 Unlike the Equal 
Protection Clause, Title VII prohibits facially neutral policies that 
have unintentional but also unnecessary disparate impacts on the 
basis of sex or race.57 While diplomatically calling the question “not 
an easy one,” Justice Scalia laid out the case for striking down that 
part of Title VII.58 He characterized race-neutral affirmative action as 
“[i]ntentinal discrimination …, just one step up the chain.”59 
                                               
52
 See infra, notes ___ and accompanying text. 
53
 The Court held that, under Title VII, an employer may use a racial classification 
as a remedy for a racially disparate impact only if there is a “strong basis in 
evidence” for believing that the employer could be found liable under Title VII’s 
disparate impact provision. See Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2664. For such a basis to exist, 
there must be not only a statistically significant disparate impact but also an 
evidentiary basis for believing that the employer could not succeed in a “business 
necessity” defense. See id. at 2678. 
54
 Id. at 2676 
55
 See id. at 2676 
56
 See id. at 2681-83 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
57
 See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k). 
58
 See Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2681-83 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
59
 Id. at 2682. 
  
 
 
  CONTINGENT EQUAL PROTECTION 15 
 
DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE 
 
 
The same reasoning can be applied in the context of higher 
education. For example, Justice Thomas’s dissent in Grutter v. 
Bollinger argued that the University of Michigan Law School should 
have pursued other means for achieving diversity, rather than 
classifying its applicants on the basis of race.60 He ridiculed the state 
interest in affirmative action as an interest in retaining admissions 
criteria that have a disparate impact on minority applicants.61 If the 
school was unhappy that its admissions criteria produced a racially 
homogenous class, argued Justice Thomas, it could use different 
criteria.62 If the law school followed Justice Thomas’s advice, 
however, it would adopt new admissions criteria consciously chosen 
because of their ability to produce a class with different racial 
makeup than the current system achieves. The new admissions 
system would be another Test 22, and the law school would be in the 
same position: vulnerable to an equal protection challenge from 
disappointed white applicants.63 The evidence from Parents Involved 
and Ricci is that a plurality of the current Court, including Justice 
Thomas, would deem that challenge well-founded. 
                                               
60
 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368-69 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to current 
percentage plans in Texas, California, and Florida and their similarity to nineteenth 
century certification systems). 
61
 Id. at 369-70 (“The Law School’s continued adherence to measures it knows 
produce racially skewed results is not entitled to deference by this Court.”). In this 
regard, Justice Thomas’s dissent is more radical and would require a deeper 
commitment to equality than the majority’s approach. Cf. Delahunty, supra note 
 17, at 37,41 (arguing that affirmative action is a conservative, elite-protecting 
response to inequality and noting that it was promoted by the Nixon 
Administration as the minimal available response to demands for racial justice). 
62
 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 370 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“An infinite variety of 
admissions methods are available to the Law School.”). 
63
 This challenge has already been set out in Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can’t Michigan 
Universities Use Proxies for Race After the Ban on Racial Preferences?, 13 MICH. 
J. OF RACE & L. 277 (2007); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-
Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289 
(2001). As indicated in both these articles, the argument that alternative action is 
invalid may have particular force in states that have adopted statutory bans on 
racial preferences, if those statutes are construed not to leave any leeway for 
measures that satisfy strict scrutiny. 
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If the Court were to rule against Test 22, it would effectively 
constitutionalize the status quo of racial inequality against conscious 
state action.  Possibly, in some contexts, the government could 
convincingly argue that it would have adopted the remedial measure 
regardless of the racial effect. For example, schools using economic 
integration could truthfully argue that the public controversy over 
racial integration and affirmative action brought their attention to the 
need for greater economic integration. Although they hoped that 
greater racial diversity would also result from economic diversity, 
the latter alone was sufficient reason for action. If so, the policy 
would be saved under the third step of the Arlington Heights 
doctrine, which allows a law to stand despite its racial motive if there 
was an adequate, race-independent reason for the policy.64 But race-
neutral policies adopted predominantly out of a desire for racial 
integration would be subject to strict scrutiny. 
3. The State Interest in Race-Neutral Affirmative Action 
In order to pass strict scrutiny, an alternative action program 
needs a compelling state interest. That state interest will usually be 
the desire to reduce segregation and structural inequality.65 The 
potential extension of Washington v. Davis to strike down race-
neutral affirmative action came within one vote of becoming law, 
with the plurality insisting that integration and equality were not 
                                               
64
 Like the school districts in Parents Involved, some commentators have tried to 
re-state the state interest at the core of affirmative action and integration plans so 
that it does not look like a racial classification. See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Direct 
Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 13 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 1 
(2007) (arguing that schools could replace traditional affirmative action plans with 
admissions criteria that, for example, favor applicants who have been the victims 
of race discrimination); Michael J. Kaufman, (Still) Constitutional De-Segregation 
Strategies: Teaching Racial Literacy to Secondary Students and Preferencing 
Racially-Literate Applicants to Higher Education, 13 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 137 
(2007) (arguing that race-based school assignments could be justified by the need 
to teach racial literacy, and that universities could prefer applicants who are 
racially literate). These efforts seem unlikely to survive the intent inquiry in the 
disparate impact analysis unless the Court embraces a state interest in equality. 
65
 The diversity rationale recognized in Grutter is insufficient because it does not 
allow the government to focus particularly on race. 
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compelling, and perhaps not even legitimate, state interests.66 
Providing the fifth vote to decide the case, Justice Kennedy focused 
on the means the school districts had employed. Justice Kennedy did, 
however, express his clear desire to uphold race-neutral policies for 
promoting equal opportunity.67 Because the constraints of disparate 
impact doctrine apply to race-neutral policies, that outcome depends 
on recognizing a compelling state interest in the elimination of 
structural inequality.  
The plurality opinion analyzed the school districts’ integration 
plans under the usual two-step strict scrutiny framework.68 The first 
step is to identify the state interests and determine whether they are 
compelling.69 The second step is to ask whether the means chosen 
are narrowly tailored to serve those compelling state interests.70 The 
plurality concluded that the school districts had no compelling state 
interest in racially integrated schools.71 Unlike universities, grade 
schools do not generally choose their student bodies. They do not 
make conscious efforts to achieve the holistic, multi-faceted diversity 
that was extolled in Grutter v. Bollinger, which upheld affirmative 
action in admissions to the University of Michigan law school. 
Because in truth only racial diversity was at stake in Parents 
Involved, the plurality had an easy time using Grutter to condemn the 
state interest.72 If the plurality had prevailed in condemning the 
integration plans at the first, state-interest phase of the analysis, it 
would have set the stage for constitutional challenges to all race-
neutral efforts to achieve racial integration or ameliorate racial 
inequality.   
                                               
66
 See Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 725-33 (2007) (equating all of the school district’s claimed interests with 
“racial balancing” for its own sake). 
67
 See id. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
68
 See id. at 720. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. at 2755-59; id. at 2770 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he school districts lack 
an interest in preventing resegregation.”). 
72
 Id. at 2757. 
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The import of the plurality’s analysis was clear—and its 
adoption by four members of the Court surprising—in light of the 
attention this issue received at oral argument. Several justices asked 
the parties’ lawyers and the Solicitor General about the status of 
facially neutral policies adopted out of a desire for racial diversity in 
the schools.73 Justice Kennedy posed the hypothetical of a school 
district deciding where to build a new school.74 In light of existing 
segregation in housing, one location would result in a racially diverse 
school, while the other would contribute to the de facto segregation 
of the schools. Could the school district choose the former, because it 
wants racial diversity?75 Counsel for the plaintiffs said that it could 
not, because any race-related motive for state action is forbidden.76 
But even the Solicitor General, who appeared in support of the 
plaintiffs, distanced himself from that position.77 Justice Scalia, too, 
was at pains to demonstrate that the legitimacy of a race-conscious 
goal was distinct from the permissibility of racial classifications as 
the means to reach that goal.78 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia joined the 
plurality opinion that would have struck down the districts’ 
integration plans on the grounds that racial integration was not a 
compelling state interest.79 Justice Scalia went even further in his 
Ricci concurrence, making the case that attempting to rectify 
disparate impacts generally is unconstitutional. Both of those 
opinions contradict what appeared to be Justice Scalia’s position at 
                                               
73
 E.g., Oral Argument, Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 2006 WL 3486958, *4-5 (Justice Kennedy, site selection); 6 (Justice Scalia, 
magnet schools); 18 (Chief Justice Roberts, sites and magnet schools); 19 (Justice 
Kennedy, site selection). 
74
 Id. at *4-5. 
75
 Id.. 
76
 Id. at *5, 7. 
77
 Id. at *18 (indicating that Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights would 
apply); 21 (stating that there is nothing unconstitutional about “desiring a mingling 
of the races and establishing policies which achieve that result but which do not 
single out individuals and disqualify them for certain things because of their 
race”); 23. 
78
 Id. at *22, 27-29. 
79
 See Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 725-33 (2007) 
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oral argument in Parents Involved.80 They also contradict Justice 
Thomas’s Grutter dissent, which proposed exactly the kind of race-
neutral but race-conscious strategies that the Parents Involved 
plurality would reject.81 
Justice Kennedy’s separate concurrence served mostly to 
explain his disagreement with the majority on this point. His 
concurrence not only endorsed the state interest in integration but 
also suggested that race-neutral integration strategies might be 
exempt from strict scrutiny.82 Some commentators have also 
suggested that benign racial policies that are facially neutral should 
receive a lower level of review.83 While consistent with the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-subordination goals, adoption of this 
approach would have to surmount several hurdles. The Court 
struggled a long time before settling on strict scrutiny for benign 
racial classifications.84 Consistency would seem to require either 
overruling that result or applying the same rule in disparate impact 
cases.85 Indeed, because the racial effects of a facially neutral policy 
might not be immediately apparent, heightened review might be 
particularly warranted. Moreover, Grutter showed that strict scrutiny 
need not be fatal. Insofar as the Court appears to be moving away 
from, or at least compressing, its rigid tiers of scrutiny, the most 
                                               
80
 Compare Oral Argument, Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 2006 WL 3486958, *22, 27-29 (Justice Scalia distinguishing face-
conscious goals from racial classification as a means) with Parents Involved, 505 
U.S. at 725-33 (rejecting race-conscious goals as non-compelling). 
81
 See supra, notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas’s 
Grutter dissent). 
82
 See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
83
 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 
1048-49 (1998). 
84
 See Parents Involved, 505 U.S. at 741-42 (describing the history of the Court’s 
consideration of this issue). 
85
 See Karlan, supra note 2, at 1387-90 (noting that Kennedy’s proposal on this 
point “would completely transform existing equal protection doctrine” and “simply 
cannot be right”); see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note __, at 2337 (“Only arguments 
that take existing doctrine seriously can provide public universities and other state 
actors with a good-faith basis for adopting race-neutral affirmative action policies 
and the courts with a judicially principled basis upon which to uphold them.”). 
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natural development for disparate impact doctrine would be to apply 
Grutter’s moderated strict scrutiny while recognizing the state’s 
compelling interest in eliminating structural inequality.86 
Equal protection doctrine ordinarily requires the government to 
treat similarly situated individuals alike. Contingent equal protection 
recognizes that groups of people may not be similarly situated, not 
because of anything inherent in the individuals themselves but 
because of existing conditions of group-based, structural inequality. 
Recognizing this inequality—and the state’s compelling interest in 
combating it—allows the government to pursue a race-conscious 
goal without running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause as long as 
the means used are narrowly tailored. 
B. Structural Inequality and Racial Classifications 
In affirmative action cases, the Supreme Court has rejected the 
state’s interest in providing a remedy for mere “societal 
discrimination” as not sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict 
scrutiny.87 That rejection, however, should not be allowed to obscure 
the important role that the state interest in racial equality has played 
in more recent decisions. 
This Article refers to the state interest in reducing structural 
inequality rather than the interest in giving a remedy for societal 
discrimination. This change in vocabulary implies not an entirely 
different set of social facts but a different perspective and more 
precise understanding of those facts. In the 1970s, when the Court 
first considered this sort of justification for racial classifications, 
societal discrimination seemed too amorphous a concept on which to 
                                               
86
 For discussion of this apparent trend in equal protection doctrine, see Andrew M. 
Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for 
Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339 (2006); 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004) 
(focusing particularly on Grutter and Gratz); Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Between 
the Tiers: The New[est] Equal Protection and Bush v. Gore, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
372 (2002). 
87
 See infra, part I.B.1. 
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build an equal protection analysis.88 Moreover, the interest was 
characterized as a way to mete out compensation to victims of 
discrimination, rather than a way to eliminate racial hierarchy.89 
Thirty years later, the legal community has a more sophisticated 
understanding of how racial inequality is perpetuated by social 
structures, the reproduction of unconscious racism, and failure fully 
to redress private acts of discrimination.90 
To the extent that the concept of structural inequality overlaps 
with the concept of societal discrimination, the Court’s rejection of 
the latter must be understood in the context in which it occurred: 
affirmative action cases in which benefits were distributed based on 
racial classifications of individuals. Individual classification by race, 
which Andrew Carlon has termed racial adjudication, is particularly 
troubling to the Court.93 In other contexts that do not require racial 
adjudication, reducing inequality should be considered a compelling 
state interest under either ordinary equal protection analysis or 
disparate impact analysis. To hold otherwise would be to allow 
disparate impact doctrine to complete the transformation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from a promise of equality to a tool for 
maintaining the status quo.94  
                                               
88
 See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 438 U.S. 265, 307 (Powell, J., 
announcing judgment). 
89
 See id. at 306 and n. 43 (characterizing the state’s purpose as compensatory, and 
expressly reserving the possibility that a racial preference could be justified if it 
were designed to compensate for unconscious bias). 
90
 See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Framing Affirmative Action, MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 123, 131-32 (2006) (describing structural inequality with a track 
metaphor: “the problem affirmative action seeks to address is not damaged 
runners, but damaged lanes that make the race more difficult for some competitors 
to run than others”); Karlan, supra note 2, at 1374-77 (noting that in Parents 
Involved, “the concurrence and the dissent saw racial separation as a persistent, and 
persistently constitutionally troubling, aspect of American society, while the 
majority saw the same facts on the ground as something beyond the reach of 
government”). 
93
 Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1151. 
94
 See generally Bodensteiner, The Supreme Court as the Major Barrier to Racial 
Equality, supra note _; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds 
Other Than Race”:The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal 
Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 UNIV. ILL. L. REV.615 (2003); Haney López, 
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1. Inequality in the Affirmative Action Cases 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of “societal discrimination” as a 
justification for racial classifications must be understood in context. 
In his foundational opinion in Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke,95 Justice Powell said that responding to societal 
discrimination, for which the University’s medical school was not 
specifically responsible, could not justify affirmative action in the 
school’s admissions program.96 The Court has generally adhered to 
Justice Powell’s position with respect to affirmative action programs 
and has held that generalized societal discrimination could not justify 
minority set-asides in government contracting.97 Nonetheless, the 
Court’s most recent cases indicate that structural inequality has a role 
to play in evaluating the constitutionality of affirmative action. 
The Court’s most recent foray into this area at last produced 
majority opinions that settled several questions about affirmative 
action in higher education. Grutter v. Bollinger98 and Gratz v. 
Bollinger99 challenged admissions programs at the University of 
Michigan. Gratz involved the undergraduate program and Grutter 
the law school. The Supreme Court held that the university had a 
compelling state interest in the educational benefits of a diverse 
student body.100 The law school’s admissions program passed strict 
scrutiny because it evaluated each applicant holistically, without 
placing dispositive weight on race in any particular case.101 The 
undergraduate program, however, was unconstitutional because it 
assigned specified points based on race and made race dispositive in 
some cases.102 At the end of the Grutter opinion, the Court 
announced an apparent sunset provision, stating that it did not expect 
                                                                                                            
supra note 14; Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law, supra note _. 
95
 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
96
 Id. at 307-09 (Powell, J., announcing the judgment). 
97
 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
98
 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
99
 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
100
 Id. at 325, 382-33. 
101
 Id. at 334. 
102
 Id. at 269. 
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the law school’s affirmative action program to be necessary for more 
than another generation, about twenty-five years.103 
In both Grutter and Gratz, the University of Michigan was 
careful not to propound societal discrimination as its justification for 
affirmative action, relying instead on its interest in having a diverse 
student body for educational purposes. This strategy reflected the 
fact that Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion had become the “touchstone 
for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.”104 
Accordingly, a defense based on societal discrimination would have 
been doomed. 
Nonetheless, Grutter’s sunset clause indicates that existing 
inequality played a role in the Court’s analysis. The university’s 
primary interest was in having a diverse student body. Existing 
conditions of inequality made that goal difficult to achieve using its 
traditional admissions criteria. The Court acknowledged the 
existence of social inequality and the fact that this inequality had an 
adverse effect on the educational interest in diversity.105 In the 
absence of affirmative action, the university would have not only 
reflected but perpetuated the unequal status quo. Inequality thus 
served as a second-order justification for affirmative action. The 
sunset clause expressed the hope that this background inequality, and 
thus the need for affirmative action, would be eliminated within a 
generation. (After all, the law school’s educational interest in a 
diverse student body would not become more or less compelling with 
the passage of time.) The sunset clause was thus an implicit 
                                               
103
 Id. at 342-43. For analysis of this aspect of the opinion, see, e.g., Joel K. 
Goldstein, Justice O’Connor’s Twenty-Five Year Expectation: The Legitimacy of 
Durational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83 (2006); Mark W. Cordes, 
Affirmative Action After Grutter and Gratz, 24 N. ILL. U. L.R. 691, 747-50 (2004). 
104
 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003). 
105
 See id. at 328 (recognizing the law school’s compelling interest in a diverse 
student body), 338 (stating that minority applicants are “less likely to be admitted 
in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore [their] experiences” attributable to 
“our Nation’s struggle with racial inequality”). 
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acknowledgement that the Court’s application of the Equal 
Protection Clause was contingent on existing structural inequality.106 
In addition, the state interest in diversity itself contained an 
implicit equality component. Although the law school emphasized 
the educational benefits of diversity, the Court spoke also of the 
social benefits of diversity in the professions.107 The law school 
needed a diverse student body not only because students would learn 
better but also because it was necessary, for society’s sake, “that the 
path to leadership be visibly open.”108 The law school’s affirmative 
action program was permissible, in part, because it would help 
remedy the stratification produced by the mechanisms of structural 
inequality.109 
In Grutter, then, structural inequality played a background role, 
somewhat obscured by the educational interest in diversity. Bakke 
and its progeny mean at most that eliminating inequality, by itself, is 
not a compelling state interest sufficient to justify traditional 
affirmative action programs. That is not the same as saying that 
eliminating inequality is never a compelling state interest.110 The two 
steps of strict scrutiny are not so isolated from each other that the 
acceptability of the means cannot affect whether a particular interest 
is deemed compelling.111 The Court’s fundamental objection to 
affirmative action is not to the goal—whether that be diversity or 
                                               
106
 See Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty-Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 
CONST. COMMENT. 171, 173 (2004) (noting that the sunset clause implies a 
remedial or equality-seeking rationale in tension with the diversity rationale 
highlighted by the Court). 
107
 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. 
108
 Id. 
109
 Cf. Johnson, supra note __, at 173 . 
110
 It also does not rule out the possibility that even traditional affirmative action 
programs would be permissible for this purpose on a showing that other means 
were ineffective. 
111
 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) 
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (both 
arguing that the Court in truth applies a multi-factored  sliding scale analysis when 
analyzing equal protection claims); see also supra, note 47 (citing literature on 
Supreme Court’s apparent drift away from rigid tiers of scrutiny). 
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equality, both of which the Court invoked in Grutter—but to the 
means. 
2. Holistic Evaluation and the Problem of Racial 
Adjudication 
Traditional affirmative action programs promote equal 
opportunity by classifying individuals on the basis of race and using 
those classifications to distribute benefits. It is primarily this act of 
classification, not the state interest in equality, to which the Supreme 
Court has usually objected. 112 
The term racial adjudication, coined by Andrew Carlon, refers 
to a governmental practice of defining racial categories and placing 
individuals into one category or another for the purpose of 
distributing benefits or burdens.113 Racial adjudication is only one 
kind of racial classification, since government can use race in other 
ways—record-keeping or general policy decisions—that do not 
involve distributing benefits or burdens to individuals.114 Racial 
adjudications, such as affirmative action programs, are more 
troubling to the Supreme Court than other racial classifications.115 
The Court’s discomfort with racial categorization was apparent 
even as it upheld the University of Michigan’s law school admissions 
program. One of the more frustrating aspects of the Grutter and 
Gratz decisions was the Court’s apparent preference for obscurity in 
the decision-making process of an affirmative action program. The 
Court preferred the law school’s “holistic” approach that did not 
assign numerical values to race or other elements of diversity, rather 
than the undergraduate point system.116 As Justice Ginsburg argued, 
                                               
112
 See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 796-97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) 
113
 Carlon, supra note 52, at 1159-60 (defining racial adjudication). 
114
 See id. at 1158-59. 
115
 See Parents Involved, 505 U.S. at 796-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring the judgment). 
116
 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334-39 (2003) (favorably describing law 
school’s program and concluding it was narrowly tailored); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
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“If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan’s accurately 
described, fully disclosed College affirmative action program is 
preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and 
disguises.”117 
Two factors are likely to have driven the Court’s preference for 
the opaque rather than the transparent process. First is a preference 
for suppressing controversy and conflict.118 If there are to be racial 
preferences in admissions, better that they be obscured so that no one 
can say for sure what effect they had, and fewer feelings will be hurt. 
Second is the Court’s discomfort with the mere act of 
classifying individuals by race. To classify individuals by race, the 
government must have a definition of race, something the Supreme 
Court has not had to confront since it rejected Homer Plessy’s claim 
that he was white.119 Slavery, Jim Crow, and legal segregation all 
required an official system for stamping each person with a racial 
label, often using the infamous “one drop of blood” rule.120 A point 
                                                                                                            
U.S. 244, 270-74 (2003) (concluding that the undergraduate point system was not 
narrowly tailored). 
117
 See 539 U.S. 244, 305 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
118
 See Delahunty, supra note 17, at 69 (arguing that the Court’s strategy has been 
to pursue a brokered peace of allowing limited affirmative action rather than to 
choose between competing visions of racial justice) (“The opacity of the law 
school’s race-conscious admissions process was its virtue, the transparency of the 
college’s admissions process was its vice. Opacity in this context mutes racial envy 
and antagonism, transparency breeds them.”); cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Shub 
and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore From Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 170, 287-88 (2001) (discussing the Court’s reaction to the perceived chaos of 
post-2000 election Florida and concluding, “To judge from what this Court does, 
not what it says, high on [its] list of values is the preservation of a stable order and 
of an appearance of regularity. Low on that list is an energized, politicized, unruly 
electorate struggling to find its way toward concrete outcomes ….”); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866-69 (1992) (arguing 
that vociferous popular protest against Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was all 
the more reason to re-affirm rather than overrule it) (discussed in Tribe, supra, at 
289-90).  
119
 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541-42, 549, 552 (1896) (holding that the 
state could choose how to define race for purposes of its Jim Crow laws). 
120
 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 n. 4 (1967) (quoting Virginia 
statutes defining white persons as those with “no trace whatever of any blood other 
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system for affirmative action admissions requires each person to be 
classified, even if not necessarily under the same rule.121 Under a 
holistic system, the classification can be fudged. The increasing 
proportion of the population who check “other” when asked their 
race on census forms can, in fact, be treated as individuals rather than 
forced into one of a few categories. A holistic system avoids the 
potential for litigation in which a court is asked to decide whether the 
government has applied the wrong racial label to a modern-day 
Homer Plessy. 
The Parents Involved opinions highlighted the evils of racial 
adjudication. The plurality framed its holding as concerned with the 
distribution of “burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial 
classifications.”122 Justice Kennedy criticized the Seattle school 
district’s “blunt distinction between ‘white’ and ‘nonwhite,’” which 
tells “each student he or she is to be defined by race.”123 The weight 
this concern should receive is certainly open to debate.124 It is, 
                                                                                                            
than Caucasian,” with a minor exception designed to “honor[] the descendants of 
John Rolfe and Pocahontes”). 
121
 Most affirmative action programs rely on self-identification, a system which has 
generated surprisingly little controversy (at least to the point of inspiring litigation) 
over the correctness of those self-designations. See Carlon, supra note 52, at 1164-
65 (noting that there are few documented instances of “abuse” of affirmative action 
by non-minorities). Slightly more common are disputes over “close cases,” such as 
whether a person of Arab descent is “white.” See id.; Al-Khazraji v. St. Francis 
College, 784 F.2d 505, 514-18 (1986) (invoking congressional intent to hold that 
Arab plaintiff could proceed with race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981, regardless of whether Arabs were “taxonomically Caucasian”). For an 
example of what the Supreme Court presumably wants to avoid, see Edward C. 
Thomas, Racial Classification and the Flawed Pursuit of Diversity: How Phantom 
Minorities Threaten “Critical Mass” Justification in Higher Education, 2007 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 813 (2007) (arguing that universities that fail to establish and 
enforce precise racial definitions have failed to narrowly tailor their affirmative 
action programs to their interest in diverse student bodies). 
122
 Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
720 (2007). 
123
 Id. at 787. 
124
 See, e.g., id. at 867 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This is not to deny that there is a 
cost in applying ‘a state-mandated racial label.’ But that cost does not approach, in 
degree or in kind, the terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste system, and 80 
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however, a legitimate concern that is important to the Court’s swing 
vote. It is therefore worth isolating the effect of the racial 
adjudication problem, in order to avoid over-generalizing the Court’s 
existing precedents. That is, the Court’s hostility to racial 
adjudication should not be allowed to taint the state interest in 
equality. In the interplay of state interests with narrow tailoring that 
is strict scrutiny, equality may be a compelling state interest even if it 
is not always strong enough for the Court to allow racial adjudication 
as the means to achieve it. 
The Court’s aversion to racial adjudication makes it 
inappropriate to allow the affirmative action cases to stand for the 
general proposition that equality is not a compelling state interest. 
The Court’s rejection of societal discrimination as a compelling 
interest should be understood in context. The affirmative action 
programs struck down in Gratz and Bakke required classification of 
individuals into fixed racial categories. In contrast, the Court’s 
acknowledgement of existing inequality played at least some role in 
upholding the law school’s program in Grutter, which avoided strict 
racial adjudication.125 Grutter and Gratz, then, should be understood 
as leaving open the possibility of structural inequality as a 
compelling state interest. 
3. Structural Inequality as a Compelling State Interest 
Parents Involved required the Court to confront whether the 
equality interest it had seemed to reject in affirmative action cases 
could be compelling in the K-12 context. No kind of diversity other 
than racial diversity was at stake, so the “holistic evaluation” 
approach proved a dead end.126 Although the Court struck down the 
Seattle and Louisville integration plans, the dissent and Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence both recognized the state interest in racial 
                                                                                                            
years of legal racial segregation.”) (quoting id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment)). 
125
 See supra,  text accompanying notes 76-89. 
126
 All that Louisville obtained by trying to present its assignment plan as flexible 
and holistic was Justice Kennedy’s criticism that the plan was too confusing. See 
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 784-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
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equality.127 They thus preserved for the moment the viability of an 
equal protection analysis contingent on existing conditions of 
structural inequality. The plurality, however, strongly suggested that 
it would have struck down the plans because there was no 
compelling, or perhaps even legitimate, interest in racial 
integration.128 
The plurality opinion dealt with both the Seattle and the 
Louisville integration plans. Although the plurality concluded that 
the plans were not narrowly tailored, it went even further to reject the 
claimed state interest in integration. The plurality argued that the 
focus on race alone belied a generalized interest in student body 
diversity.129 That left the school districts to rely on an interest that 
was variously characterized as “reduc[ing] racial concentration” or 
“ensur[ing] that racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent 
nonwhite students from having access to the most desirable 
schools.”130 The stated rationales carefully avoided the term “racial 
balancing,” which the Court had vilified in Grutter.131 In truth, 
however, the asserted state interest boiled down to undoing de facto 
segregation and structural inequality.132 The plurality would have 
                                               
127
 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (rejecting the implication of the plurality opinion that 
states “must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools”), 797-98 
(recognizing a compelling interest in “avoiding racial isolation”); id. at 838-45 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing a compelling interest in diversity or integration 
with three elements: historical/ remedial, educational, and democratic). 
128
 See id. at 725-33 (plurality opinioin) (no compelling interest); id. at 751 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (no interest at all in “preventing resegregation”). 
129
 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he plans here 
employ only a limited notion of diversity.”; “[R]ace is not simply one factor 
weighed with others in reaching a decision as in Grutter; it is the factor.”). 
130
 Id. at 725-26 (summarizing the claimed state interests). 
131
 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
132
 This article accepts the premise that a purpose and at least possible effect of 
integration is to help reduce structural racial inequality, while acknowledging that 
people of good faith disagree about whether integration plans are the best strategy 
from either an equality or an educational perspective. There are good reasons for 
viewing so-called de facto segregation as both a symptom and a mechanism of 
structural inequality, as opposed to a mere reflection of personal choices. With 
respect to education, Parents Involved suggests two ways in which the school 
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district might see integration as a response to inequality. First, the racially 
identifiable schools in Seattle were separate but not equal, as the district 
acknowledged by arguing that its integration plan was necessary “to make sure that 
racially segregated housing patterns did not prevent non-white students from 
having equitable access to the most popular over-subscribed schools.”  Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 786-87  (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). This pattern is so entrenched that it is often invisible, as was 
reflected in one of Justice Scalia’s hypotheticals in the oral argument of the 
Lousiville case. In the course of asking about how to distinguish benign from 
invidious racial motives, Justice Scalia posited schools that were equal in all 
respects except racial makeup while simultaneously stipulating that the white 
schools were the good schools. See Oral Argument, Meredith v. Jefferson Cnty. 
Bd. of Educ., 2006 WL 3486966. Second, if the purpose of education is not merely 
to increase scores on standardized math and reading tests but to produce citizens 
who have absorbed democratic values, integrated schooling is likely preferable. 
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“The Nation’s schools strive to teach that our strength 
comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment 
to the freedom of all.”); Ryan, supra note 2, at 132, 142-44 (arguing that Parents 
Involved will have little effect on the ground because, inter alia, today’s focus is 
test scores, not citizenship) (“The idea that schools should also teach students from 
diverse backgrounds how to cooperate in preparation for citizenship, like the idea 
of integration, has been pushed into the background.”); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 
The Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There Is No Other Way, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 158, 182 (2007) (equating education with training to master specific skills); 
see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (mocking the suggestion 
that law schools, as opposed to kindergartens, should teach citizenship); but see 
Jennifer S. Hendricks, “We reserve the right to refuse service to anyone,” 76 
TENN. L. REV. 417 (2009) (reflecting on teaching constitutional law as citizenship 
for lawyers). 
     The values and cross-racial understanding that integrated schooling may 
produce can be viewed through a race-as-ethnicity lens or as breaking down one of 
the mechanisms of structural inequality. See Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy 
and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 116 (2007) 
(arguing that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved reflects concern for 
the schools’ ability to teach civic morality) (“[Even a judge committed to the 
colorblind ideal might worry … that the value of colorblindness cannot be learned 
in a racially segregated school.”). The possibility that integration serves these ends 
is at least strong enough that a state actor should be allowed the chance to show 
that it has narrowly tailored its own integration efforts to achieve them. 
  
 
 
  CONTINGENT EQUAL PROTECTION 31 
 
DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE 
 
 
struck down both plans on the grounds that these interests were not 
compelling—or, at least in Justice Thomas’s view, even legitimate—
because they took race into account.133   
Although Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality on the 
outcome, he sided with the dissent on the question of the state 
interest: he accepted that the claimed state interest in avoiding racial 
isolation was compelling.134    His objection to the schools’ plans 
came at the second step of the strict scrutiny analysis, the 
requirement of narrow tailoring. The substance of that objection was 
to the state’s classification of individuals by race: “[O]fficial labels 
proclaiming the race of all persons in a broad class of citizens … are 
unconstitutional as the cases now come to us.”135 
Justice Kennedy’s point of disagreement with the plurality thus 
made explicit what had been implicit in prior affirmative action 
cases. The Court’s seeming protestations to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the state has a compelling interest in combating the 
racial status quo. In crafting policy to serve that interest, however, 
some means are more acceptable than others, and racial adjudication 
must be kept as a last resort.136 
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy’s opinion progressed from a 
Grutter-like diversity rationale to equality concerns as he discussed 
different kinds of state action. When discussing acceptable state 
interests for individual classifications, he spoke in terms of diversity, 
                                               
133
 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 729-33 (plurality opinion) (concluding that an 
interest in racial integration, which “cannot be the goal,” is equivalent to racial 
balancing); see also id. at 751 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he school districts 
lack an interest in preventing resegregation.”). 
134
 See also id. at 783-84, 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (summarizing disagreement with plurality); id. at 787-88 (“The 
plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in 
ensuring all people have equal opportunities regardless of their race.”). 
135
 Id. at 782. 
136
 See id. at 790 (“And individual racial classifications employed in this manner 
may be considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling 
interest.”). 
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and squarely within the race-as-ethnicity perspective.137 From this 
perspective, race is one of many personal characteristics that make 
up the range of human experience, but it does not necessarily 
implicate a hierarchy.138 Ian Haney López has chronicled how this 
conception of race promotes a doctrine of strict colorblindness at the 
expense of other Fourteenth Amendment values, particularly the 
elimination of racial subordination.139 Justice Kennedy’s critique of 
the Seattle plan fits squarely within this tradition.140 His main 
objection to the Seattle plan was to its “blunt distinction between 
‘white’ and ‘nonwhite,’” which failed to account for substantial 
racial and ethnic diversity in the “nonwhite” category. 141 When 
Justice Kennedy discussed the educational benefits of diversity, 
racial difference was merely a matter of perspective, not hierarchy. 
When he turned, however, to the question of alternative, race-
conscious integration measures, Justice Kennedy spoke the language 
of equality. He opened with a nod to racial progress that 
acknowledged “the flaws and injustices that remain” and the need for 
“assurance that opportunity is not denied on account of race.”142 The 
state interest at stake was the government’s interest in “ensuring all 
people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.”143 He took 
on the plurality’s invocation of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, explaining that “Our Constitution is colorblind” must be 
                                               
137
 See Haney López, supra note 14 at 1006-11 (describing development of 
ideology treating race as a form of ethnicity). 
138
 See id. at 990 (arguing that the ethnicity perspective “suggested that racial 
subordination was largely past and that social inequalities, if any, reflected the 
cultural failings of minorities themselves”). 
139
 See id. at 990 (“[M]y primary aim in this Article is to demonstrate that race-as-
ethnicity provided the first coherent intellectual justification for reactionary 
colorblindness.”); id. at 1011-12 (arguing that “ethnicity operated [to depict] 
affirmative action, not as a needed national response to racial subordination, but 
instead as the sort of group rent-seeking one would expect in the context of ethnic 
group competition”). 
140
 Cf. Gerken, supra note 82, at 108 (referring to the “anti-essentialist boilerplate” 
in Kennedy’s opinion). 
141
 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
142
 Id.. 
143
 Id. 
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read in context.144 He summed up his disagreement with the plurality 
as follows: “To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the 
Constitution mandates that state and local authorities must accept the 
racial status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, 
profoundly mistaken.”145 Justice Kennedy thus made clear that he 
supports state efforts to reduce structural inequality, but only if racial 
adjudication is avoided. 
The claim that societal discrimination is not a compelling state 
interest has been repeated so often in affirmative action cases that it 
has taken on a life of its own. It thus became capable of threatening 
not only programs that depend on facial classifications but even race-
neutral forms of affirmative action. At the same time, however, the 
Supreme Court’s own reasoning has invoked the state’s interest in 
equality and demonstrated that the real objection is to means that rely 
too heavily on racial adjudication. The government’s ability to 
practice this contingent form of equal protection narrowly survived 
Parents Involved. Despite all the inveighing against racial balancing, 
the problem in Parents Involved was not in the fact that racial 
balance was sought but in how it was achieved. The government can 
legitimately seek racial integration, but it must try to do so without 
stamping each person with a racial identity.146 Subject to limits that 
reflect that concern, the state has a compelling interest in overcoming 
structural inequality. 
                                               
144
 Id. at 788; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). 
145
 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). This statement also serves as an appropriate rejoinder 
to Justice Thomas’s invocation of another famous line, paraphrasing, “The 
Fourteenth Amendment did not enact the dissent’s newly minted understanding of 
liberty.”). Id. at 767, n. 15 (Thomas, J., concurring); cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The Fourteenth Amendment did not 
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”). Of course, the Parents Involved 
dissent would not have enacted any particular understanding of liberty or equality; 
it would merely have permitted the people of Seattle and Louisville to pursue their 
understanding. It was the Parents Involved plurality that, like the Lochner Court, 
sought to constitutionalize a particular social theory (in both cases, maintenance of 
a status quo of unequal power and protect it against legislative interference). 
146
 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
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II. Contingent Equal Protection and Sex Inequality 
After centuries of pernicious racial classifications, judicial 
scrutiny became strict just as government was becoming more likely 
to enact racial classifications that could plausibly be described as 
benign or remedial.147 Scrutiny of sex classifications remains 
formally less strict.148 As a result, contingent equal protection has 
flourished in sex cases far more than in race cases.149 Indeed, in the 
context of sex classifications, contingent equal protection can be 
generalized to include state action premised not just on social 
inequality but also on what the Supreme Court has perceived as 
biological inequality—more accurately described as the socially 
unequal consequences of biological sex differences.150 Moreover, 
classification of individuals according to sex, rather than race, is not 
troubling to the Court.151 Isolating that factor and uniting the sex and 
race cases under the rubric of contingent equal protection reveals the 
conceptual bankruptcy of the Parents Involved plurality’s attempt to 
reject the state’s compelling interest in equality. 
Part II.A discusses the Court’s greater tolerance for sex 
classifications designed to remedy structural inequality. It argues that 
this tolerance is attributable to the Court’s comfort with government-
imposed, binary sex classifications, as compared to its discomfort 
with racial adjudication. The contingent equal protection cases 
involving sex classifications thus repudiate (and are threatened by) 
the claim that the government lacks a compelling interest in 
eliminating structural inequality. Part II.B extends this argument to 
                                               
147
 See generally Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Supreme Court as the Major Barrier to 
Racial Equality, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 199 (2009). 
148
 See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (formally adhering to 
intermediate scrutiny for sex classifications); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) 
(demonstrating that U.S. v. Virginia had not ratcheted up review of sex 
classifications by applying extremely deferential review to a sex classification 
clearly rooted in stereotypes). 
149
 See infra, part II.A. 
150
 See infra, part II.B. In most of the cases discussed below, the Court typically 
characterizes women’s biology as imposing a burden, rather than as a difference 
that can be a burden or an ability to varying degrees depending on social structures. 
151
 See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text. 
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sex cases that involve biological sex differences in lieu of other 
structural inequality. This extension to “real differences” cases 
provides the groundwork for Part III’s discussion of future 
developments in contingent equal protection. 
A. Structural Inequality and Sex Classifications 
One of the ironies of equal protection doctrine is that it is easier 
to justify remedial sex classifications than to justify remedial or 
benign racial classifications.152 Doctrinally, this discrepancy is a 
function of the lower level of scrutiny for sex classifications, which 
gives the government more leeway in shaping gender relations.153 Of 
course, governments often use this leeway to perpetuate stereotypes 
and inequality.154 They can also use it, however, to try to improve the 
relative status of women, including through affirmative action 
programs.155 
                                               
152
 See Mary K. O’Melveny, Playing the “Gender” Card: Affirmative Action and 
Working Women, 84 KY. L. REV. 863, 864-65 (1996). (“Ironically, the 
unwillingness to employ strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications means that, 
under the Court's most recent rulings on affirmative action issues, affirmative 
action programs for women may survive challenge where comparable race- based 
programs will not. Or, to put the issue another way, white men may look to greater 
constitutional protections from race-based affirmative action plans (however well-
intentioned) than exist for women challenging programs that discriminate based 
upon sex.”) (footnote omitted). 
153
 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (adopting intermediate 
standard of review for sex classifications). Intermediate scrutiny requires that the 
state action be substantially related to an important state interest, as opposed to 
strict scrutiny’s requirement that state action be narrowly tailored to a compelling 
state interest. 
154
 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding naturalization laws 
distinguishing among foreign-born children based on the sex of the citizen parent, 
based in part on governmental interest in avoiding citizenship claims by foreign-
born children of U.S. servicemen and businessmen). Although I have criticized the 
analyses of both the majority and the dissent regarding the statute’s presumption of 
a connection between mother and child, the dissent was correct that the statute 
rested on archaic gender stereotypes. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a 
Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 429, 470 and nn. 238-36 (2007) 
(noting points of agreement with the Nguyen dissent). 
155
 See, e.g., Johnson v. Santa Clara County Trans. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) 
(upholding a sex-based affirmative action program against a Title VII challenge). 
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A striking example of a remedial sex classification was the 
compensatory social security program upheld in Califano v. 
Webster.156 For several years, women and men were subject to 
different rules for excluding their low-earning years from the social 
security benefits calculation.157 The result was higher benefits for a 
woman than for a man with the same earning history.158 The 
Supreme Court had no trouble accepting the important state interest 
justifying this rule: “[r]eduction of the disparity in economic 
condition between men and women caused by the long history of 
discrimination against women.”159 Less dramatically, the same state 
interest has justified affirmative action for women in areas such as 
public employment, which has proceeded with far less controversy 
than what swirls around race-based affirmative action.160 Equal 
protection analysis contingent on the fact of existing inequality is 
thus well established  in the field of sex classifications.161 
Importantly, the gender differential in Webster was intended to 
redress private discrimination in employment. There was no 
suggestion that Congress was at fault or had itself violated the Equal 
Protection Clause by, say, failing to outlaw discrimination by private 
                                               
156
 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). 
157
 Id. at 314-16. 
158
 Id. at 316. 
159
 Id. at 317. 
160
 See O’Melveny, supra note 101, at 864-65; but see Celia M. Ruiz, Legal 
Standards Regarding Gender Equity and Affirmative Action, 100 ED. L. REP. 841 
(1995) (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s application of strict scrutiny to sex-based 
affirmative action in order to eliminate this anomaly). In the educational context, 
some institutions are now engaged in “reverse” affirmative action in order to 
maintain parity between male and female admissions. See Debra Frazese, The 
Gender Curve: An Analysis of Colleges’ Use of Affirmative Action Policies to 
Benefit Male Applicants, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 719 (2007) (arguing that such policies 
are unconstitutional because based on stereotypes and unsupported by any 
pedagogical objective).   
161
 The Supreme Court regularly cites Webster and the state interest in redressing 
past economic discrimination against women when cataloguing acceptable 
governmental uses of sex classifications. See, e.g., U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
533 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982); see also 
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280 (1979) (citing Webster with approval). 
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actors.162 The inequality that justified this sex classification is thus 
analogous to the structural inequality that the Parents Involved 
plurality called into question as a justification for race-conscious 
action  It is the sort of inequality that does not meet the test for state 
action and thus does not trigger a judicial remedy under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Nonetheless, Congress had a legitimate interest in 
redressing the existing inequality. Congress’s ability to favor women 
in the benefits calculation was contingent on that inequality. The 
plurality’s refusal to apply the same contingent equal protection to 
remedies for racial inequality is inconsistent not only with repeated 
signals that race-neutral affirmative action is constitutional but also 
with the Court’s willingness to apply the same analytical structure to 
the remediation of sex inequality. 
Of course, there are differences between race and sex—in 
doctrine and in reality—that might explain different outcomes. For 
example, it is difficult to imagine the Court upholding a 
compensatory social security system similar to Webster but designed 
to compensate individual members of racial minorities for private 
employment discrimination.163 A racial Webster would apply a 
different level of scrutiny. It would also reflect the Court’s greater 
aversion to racial classification of individuals. Breaking down the 
analysis, howeve,r reveals that the difference cannot lie in the 
                                               
162
 While the Equal Protection Clause might have been read to require Congress or 
the states to enact non-discrimination laws, the Supreme Court has never gone 
down that road. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1695 
n. 16 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), 
Supreme Court should have held that Congress had power to intervene under 
Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment when state had repealed its common law rule 
of equal access). 
163
 It is perhaps even more difficult to imagine that Congress would enact such a 
program. In addition to the doctrinal factors discussed in the text, a third reason 
that such a program would be neither enacted nor upheld is that redistribution of 
wealth on the basis of sex is a much less radical than redistribution on the basis of 
race. Wealth is typically held by families, which are mixed-sex far often than 
mixed-race. For those who were dependent on social security for survival, the sex 
differential upheld in Webster probably helped some older women get by. Given, 
however, that social security pays more to higher earners, the primary beneficiaries 
of the differential would have been the families of relatively prosperous, mostly 
white women. 
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legitimacy or weight of the state interest in ameliorating racial 
inequality as compared to sex inequality. Rather, the difference lies 
in what the Court considers acceptable means for ameliorating 
different kinds of equality.  
Judicial scrutiny of sex classifications is, at least in theory, less 
intense than scrutiny of race classifications in two ways. First, a race 
classification must serve a “compelling” state interest, while a sex 
classification need serve only an “important” state interest.164 
Second, the means of achieving the state interest must be 
appropriate: If the means include a race classification, it must be 
“narrowly tailored” to the state interest.165 A sex classification need 
only bear a “substantial relationship” to the state interest or, when the 
Court is feeling particularly hostile to sex classifications, have an 
“exceedingly persuasive” justification.166 If a racial Webster would 
come out differently, then the difference must lie either in the state 
interest asserted or in the means used to effectuate that interest. 
The Supreme Court has never provided a comparative analysis 
of the difference between “important” and “compelling” state 
interests. Indeed, it has barely distinguished between those categories 
and other legitimate state interests. Most legitimate state interests 
seem capable of being deemed at least important, with the sole 
exception of mere administrative convenience.167 While the 
“compelling” category may yet turn out to be narrower than the 
“important” category, the state interest in fighting inequality is 
obviously the wrong place to draw that line. To hold that equality is 
an important but not compelling goal under the Fourteenth 
Amendment would be bizarre, even where the equality sought is 
more positive and substantive than the negative right to equal 
                                               
164
 See Johnson v. Calif., 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (strict scrutiny); Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (intermediate scrutiny); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515, 524 (1996). 
165
 See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505. 
166
 See id.; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98; U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524; but see 
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (complaining that 
majority had abandoned the “exceedingly persuasive” requirement). 
167
 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98 (noting prior rejection of state interests in 
reducing probate court workload and administrative ease and convenience). 
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treatment enforced by the Court. Equally as strange would be a 
holding that racial inequality was a lesser concern than sex inequality 
under that Amendment. Thus, if contingent equal protection analysis 
produces different outcomes in race and sex cases, it cannot be 
because of the formal difference between “important” and 
“compelling” state interest.  
The Court has similarly failed to explicate the difference 
between “narrowly tailored” and “substantially related” means for 
achieving state interests by way of race or sex classifications. One of 
the reasons, however, that sex classifications trigger a lower level of 
scrutiny is that the Court does not consider the government’s 
classification of an individual as female or male to be inherently 
offensive. In Bakke, Justice Powell explained that sex classifications 
do not create the same “analytical and practical problems” as race 
classifications because “there are only two possible classifications” 
and thus “no rival groups” to claim entitlements.168 Thirty years later, 
the Court has not yet confronted cases involving intersexed or 
transsexual individuals under the Equal Protection Clause. It has 
barely scratched the surface of other claims involving individuals 
whose gender or sexual identity resists binary classification. The 
Court’s awkward stumbling in cases involving homosexuality does 
not bespeak a Court inclined to question its binary definition of 
sex.169 
Lower court cases reflect a similar insistence on the binary 
nature of sex. In Title VII cases, courts faced with questions about 
                                               
168
 Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 438 U.S. 265, 303 (Powell, J., 
announcing judgment). Justice Powell added that the perception of racial 
classifications as inherently odious stems from a “lengthy and tragic history that 
gender-based classifications do not share.” Id. 
169
 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding 
that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII but failing to provide 
useful guidance for determining when such harassment is “because of sex” as 
required by the statute). On the question of when adverse action is “because of 
sex,” see generally Jennifer S. Hendricks, Women and the Promise of Equal 
Citizenship, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 51, 85-91 (2000) (discussing “animus based on 
gender” under the Violence Against Women Act and “because of sex” under 
Title VII as applied to sexual harassment cases). 
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“correct” racial classification have in recent years fallen back on 
social reality and perception rather than purportedly scientific 
definitions of race.170 Not so for sex classifications. In cases ranging 
from discrimination to the validity of marriages, courts have insisted 
on an binary, biological definition.171 Although this approach is 
unrealistic and harmful in many contexts,172 its prevalence 
illuminates contingent equal protection doctrine: sex cases 
demonstrate what courts and other state actors may do in the face of 
historic and persisting inequality when the classification itself is not 
deemed pernicious. 
Because of the greater tolerance for individual classification, a 
greater variety of means remain open to a state actor seeking to 
ameliorate sex inequality. To implement a Webster-like program for 
race, Congress would have to define each person’s race with the 
precision of Jim Crow.173 That act of classification—not the state 
interest in equality—is what distinguishes Parents Involved from 
Webster. 
Under Grutter/Gratz and Parents Involved, the act of racial 
classification, not the desire to reduce inequality, is what created 
problems under the Equal Protection Clause. The sex cases, which 
eliminate this classification problem but are otherwise analytically 
the same, prove that the Court’s complaint has never been with the 
legitimacy of the state interest in equality. The Parents Involved 
                                               
170
 See, e.g., Al-Khazraji v. St. Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 514-18 (1986) 
(invoking congressional intent to hold that Arab plaintiff could proceed with race 
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, regardless of whether Arabs were 
“taxonomically Caucasian”). 
171
 See generally Julie Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 
265, 292-325 (1999) (surveying cases illustrative of “law’s insistence on clinging 
to a binary system that traditionally ignores the importance of self-identification”). 
172
 See Elizabeth Reilly, Radical Tweak: Relocating the Power to Assign Sex, 12 
Cardozo J.L. & Gender 297, 307-07 (2005) (summarizing literature about the 
effects on individuals of medical and legal enforcement of binary sex categories). 
173
 In fact, to accurately reflect past discrimination, Congress might well adopt 
definitions of race from the very laws that structured de jure segregation. Cf. 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541-42, 549, 552 (1896) (discussing Homer 
Plessy’s claim to property right in whiteness); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 n. 
4 (1967) (quoting Virginia’s statutes defining race). 
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plurality’s attempt to brand that interest as illegitimate is as false to 
precedent as it is to the Fourteenth Amendment itself. 
B. Real Differences and Sex Classifications 
In the race and sex cases discussed so far, contingent equal 
protection has two features. First, the contingency—the state interest 
that justifies race- or sex-conscious action—is an existing condition 
of structural inequality. Second, the contingent analysis creates 
government power rather than individual rights: a state actor can 
choose either to redress or to ignore the existing inequality. This 
section generalizes the first feature of contingent equal protection to 
include state action intended to accommodate biological sex 
differences. Part III considers the distinction between government 
choice and individual entitlement to remediation of inequality. 
Accommodating sex differences usually means accommodating 
women’s differences, given a male norm. Accommodation, like 
affirmative action, is a conservative response to inequality, since it 
retains the status quo and treats members of the disadvantaged group 
as exceptions. As with affirmative action, the Supreme Court has 
never held that governments are required to take even this small step 
toward substantive equality for women.174 But unlike the race-based 
affirmative action cases, the “real differences” cases have easily 
permitted governments to choose accommodation. With the problem 
of an inherently pernicious classification removed, government is 
free to seek affirmative, substantive equality. The real differences 
cases thus further demonstrate that the Parents Involved plurality’s 
                                               
174
 See Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 
962 (1984) (cataloguing the real differences cases) see also U.S. v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515 (1996); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). In all of these cases, the 
Supreme Court either upheld the government’s policy or (in U.S. v. Virginia) 
struck down a policy treating women and men differently because the Court 
rejected the government’s claim that they were differently situated. The Court has 
never struck down a policy of facial sex-neutrality (no matter how superficial, see 
Geduldig) because it failed to account for biological difference. Cf. Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (stating that Congress’s change of heart—
repealing the sex-differential in the social security rules—did not affect the Court’s 
analysis of whether Congress had the power to enact the differential). 
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rejection of the state interest in equality is unfounded in prior equal 
protection jurisprudence.175 
1. The Real Differences Cases 
Sylvia Law first identified the real differences cases as those in 
which the Supreme Court invokes natural sex differences to justify 
different legal treatment of men and women.176 Of course, the 
Court’s perception of which differences are natural has changed over 
time. In the infamous Bradwell v. Illinois,177 the Court perceived 
men and women as differently situated, by biology and the Creator, 
with respect to the practice of law. Purported natural differences also 
justified early labor restrictions for female workers when men’s 
contractual rights were still subject to Lochner v. New York.178 More 
recently, the Court has been receptive to real differences arguments 
only when the link to reproductive biology is more direct.179 In 
Michael M. v. Superior Court, for example, the Court accepted 
women’s vulnerability to pregnancy as a justification for sex-specific 
                                               
175
 As discussed in Part II.A, the difference between “compelling” state interests 
under strict scrutiny and “important” state interests under intermediate scrutiny 
cannot plausibly distinguish the cases. See supra, notes 140-51 and accompanying 
text. 
176
 Law, supra note __, at 962. Professor Law identified the following as real 
differences cases: Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (statutory rape 
a crime only when committed by male against female); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 
U.S. 57 (1981) (male-only registration for draft); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 
321 (1977) (exclusion of women from contact jobs in prisons); Gen. Elec. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of pregnancy from disability benefits 
policy offered by private employer); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) 
(separate rules for male and female officers under navy’s up-or-out policy); 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 48 (1974) (exclusion of pregnancy from disability 
benefits policy offered by public employer); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 
414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory pregnancy leave). 
177
 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (holding that state could exclude women from 
practice of law). 
178
 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down maximum hours laws for (presumably male) 
bakers); see Muller v. Ore., 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum hours law 
for women working in laundries). 
179
 U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down male-only admissions 
policy for public, quasi-military college), is an example of a failed modern attempt 
to restore the real differences category to something like its former scope. 
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statutory rape laws.180 In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Court equated 
femaleness with rapeability to justify restricting employment 
opportunities for female prison guards.181 
The most infamous of the real differences cases is Geduldig v. 
Ailleo.182 Geduldig involved a comprehensive short-term disability 
policy for state employees in California. The Court held that the 
exclusion only of pregnancy from coverage under the policy was not 
sex discrimination. The policy, said the Court, did not distinguish 
between women and men but between “pregnant women and 
nonpregnant persons.”183 The Constitution did not require the state to 
make up for what the Court perceived as a natural disadvantage in 
the labor market. 
Other cases, however, show that the state may choose to enact 
laws to promote sex equality in the face of sex differences. After the 
Court extended Geduldig’s cramped conception of sex 
discrimination to Title VII,184 Congress responded with the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).185 The PDA defines 
discrimination “because of sex” to include discrimination because of 
pregnancy, and it requires that pregnancy be treated the same as any 
comparable physical condition under an employer’s short-term 
disability plan.186 The PDA thus protects women not just from 
irrational discrimination based on pregnancy but also from 
                                               
180
 See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471-73 (plurality opinion). 
181
 See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336 (“The employee's very womanhood would thus 
directly undermine her capacity to provide [security].). By conceding that the sex 
differences relied upon in these more recent cases are more closely connected to 
biology than those in Bradwell, I do not mean to imply that they are not also based 
on stereotypes or gender hierarchy. See generally infra, part III.B.3; Law, supra 
note 119, at 1014 n. 217 (citing Dothard and Rostker for the point, “There is 
substantial evidence that the judiciary is not able to distinguish between biology 
and the social consequences attached to it.”). 
182
 417 U.S. 48 (1974). 
183
 Id. at 496 n. 20. 
184
 See Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 126 (1976). 
185
 42 U.S.C. § 2500e(k) 
186
 Id. 
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indifference to pregnancy’s effect on their short-term ability to 
work.187 
The State of California went even further than the PDA, 
affirmatively mandating childbirth-related maternity leave, even for 
employees who were not protected against any other short-term 
disabilities.188 The Court upheld this statute in California Federal 
Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra (CalFed),189 in which an 
employer argued that the California law constituted both sex 
discrimination and pregnancy discrimination. The employer pointed 
out that the maternity leave requirement contradicted the PDA’s 
insistence that pregnancy be treated “the same as” other comparable 
conditions.190 Looking to congressional intent, the CalFed Court read 
“the same as” to mean “no less favorably than.”191 The state was thus 
given a choice: it could seek substantively equal outcomes in the face 
of natural difference, or it could allow natural differences to translate 
into unequal outcomes. This ability to choose whether to try to 
ameliorate “natural” inequality is characteristic of contingent equal 
protection. 
A common denominator of the real differences cases is that, 
regardless of whether the classification is challenged by a male or 
female party, the justifying biology—susceptibility to pregnancy or 
rape—is constructed as the natural disadvantage of women.192 Under 
the contingent equal protection approach, the state can choose but 
has no duty to accommodate or make up for this natural 
                                               
187
 Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (holding that 
mandatory pregnancy leave for teacher still able to work was impermissible). 
188
 See WEST’S ANN. CALIF. GOV. CODE § 12945. 
189
 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
190
 Id. at 279. 
191
 Id. at 285 (“Congress intended the PDA to be a ‘floor beneath which pregnancy 
disability benefits may not drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise.’”) 
(quoting lower court decision). 
192
 As the prison context of Dothard v. Rawlinson should have helped make clear, 
vulnerability to rape is a not a biologically determined sex characteristic. It is also 
not obvious that potential for pregnancy should be constructed as a vulnerability 
rather than as an ability. See infra, part III.B.2., for a discussion of parental rights, 
the only area of law in which women’s biology is understood to confer advantage 
relative to men. 
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disadvantage. In each case, the state’s treatment of gender was 
permissible but not required. The real differences cases thus share 
the same analytical structure as other cases of contingent equal 
protection, with the purportedly natural disadvantage of biology 
playing the role of structural inequality.193 First, differential 
treatment by race or sex is justified by the Court’s acceptance of the 
claim that an inequality exists but is not the government’s fault—that 
it is not attributable to state action. Second, the state may choose 
whether to ameliorate that inequality. 
2. A Not-So-Real Difference 
The shared structure of contingent equal protection and real 
differences cases is also shown by how lawyers define the category 
of real differences cases. Two cases involving the exclusion of 
women from combat service in the military are routinely classified as 
real differences cases.194 The difference—the combat exclusion—
was clearly de jure. What mattered, however, was that, like structural 
race inequality or biological sex differences, the combat exclusion 
was unquestioned in the context of the litigation. Because an 
admitted inequality was beyond the Court’s power to remedy, 
contingent equal protection gave the government the option to level 
the playing field or to leave it askew. 
The military cases are the only modern real differences cases 
that do not claim to rest strictly on biology. Rostker v. Goldberg 
upheld male-only registration for the draft.195 Schlesinger v. Ballard 
upheld the navy’s policy of giving women extra time to achieve 
promotion under the up-or-out policy.196 Both cases were premised 
on the unchallenged exclusion of women from combat positions. In 
Rostker, women’s exclusion from combat was the purported reason 
for excluding them from the draft, since Congress believed a draft 
                                               
193
 On the relationship between biological difference and structural inequality, see 
Part II.B.3, infra. 
194
 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 
498 (1975). 
195
 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
196
 419 U.S. 498 (1975). 
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would most likely seek combat troops.197 In Ballard, exclusion from 
combat and sea duty limited women’s ability to acquire the 
prerequisites for promotion; the navy allowed them extra time to 
make up for its own discriminatory policy.198 
Rostker and Ballard are consistently classed with the real 
differences cases, even though they are based not on biological 
differences but on the military’s explicit, sex-based exclusion of 
women from combat.199 Analytically, then, Rostker and Ballard 
show that what makes a difference “real” is that the law takes it as a 
given. No party in Ballard or Rostker challenged women’s exclusion 
from combat.200 This failure made the fact that women did not serve 
in combat, even though clearly a function of law, just as “real” as the 
differences that the Court saw as imposed by nature in cases like 
Michael M., Dothard, and Geduldig. A real difference is simply one 
that the Court can not (or will not) order to be changed. 
This analytical structure unites the real differences cases with 
the explicitly remedial cases involving social security, affirmative 
action, and integration. In all of these cases, the Court’s analysis 
takes some social fact of inequality—structural inequality, biological 
sex differences, or the combat exclusion— as a given for purposes of 
the litigation. Because that social fact is treated as unproblematic 
under the Equal Protection Clause, the state is under no duty to try to 
                                               
197
 See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 76. The more likely reason for excluding women from 
registration, over the protest of military officers who testified in favor of 
registering women, was the political desire to maintain an ideology that looks to 
the male military to protect the women and children at home. 
198
 See Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508. 
199See, e.g.¸Law, supra note 119, at 962 (listing real differences cases). Although 
many would surely argue that the combat exclusion itself was justified by biology, 
the Court has not confronted that claim because the exclusion was unchallenged in 
both cases. Moreover, biology has not changed in recent decades, but the combat 
exclusion has nearly disappeared. The justifications for what remains have more to 
do with the behavior of male troops than with women’s abilities. 
200
 See Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508 (noting that plaintiff did not challenge combat and 
sea duty restrictions); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83 (White, J., dissenting) (“I assume 
what has not been challenged in this case—that excluding women from combat 
positions does not offend the Constitution.”). Although the issue was not raised, 
the majority in Rostker clearly would have upheld the combat exclusion. 
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change it. But because that social fact creates conditions of actual 
inequality, the state has a legitimate interest in change if it chooses to 
try. 
Because the analytical structure is the same, the plurality view 
in Parents Involved threatens not only remedial efforts that involve 
race-conscious state action but also those that involve sex 
classifications and even sex-conscious social policy. For example, 
under Geduldig, the PDA and the California maternity leave statute 
arguably do not contain sex classifications. Because pregnancy is not 
a sex classification, special protection for pregnancy fails to trigger 
heightened review, just as the targeted exclusion failed to trigger 
heightened review in Geduldig. However, both the PDA and the 
California law were adopted to give women a relative advantage, as 
compared to a status quo in which disfavored treatment of pregnancy 
was legal. Altering the playing field in women’s favor was a 
motivating factor for the legislation. 
Similarly, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),201 
although gender neutral on its face, was enacted and even upheld by 
the Supreme Court as an attempt to achieve greater substantive 
equality for women in the workplace.202 Although Congress could 
have enacted the FMLA solely pursuant to its power to regulate 
interstate commerce, states would have been immune from damages 
suits by their employees.203 For states to be liable under the FMLA, 
Congress had to act pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment.204 In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs, the Supreme Court held that Congress could use the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the FMLA against the states.205 
To reach this conclusion, the Court had to strain to identify a pattern 
of state action unconstitutionally discriminating against female 
employees that corresponded to the remedy provided by the 
                                               
201
 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54. 
202
 See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
203
 See id. at 726 (explaining states’ sovereign immunity under Eleventh 
Amendment and Congress’s power to abrogate immunity pursuant to Section 5 of 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
204
 See id. 
205
 See id. at 740. 
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FMLA.206 A more honest assessment of the FMLA is that its purpose 
was to alter the playing field: to restructure employment markets to 
accommodate employees with caretaking responsibilities, in large 
part in order to achieve greater substantive sex equality. 
If eliminating de facto racial segregation is not a legitimate state 
interest, it is hard to see how the government would fare much better 
in claiming an interest in restructuring employment markets to 
facilitate greater achievement by a naturally less suited class of 
people (such as women who have or plan to have or might 
accidentally have children). A Supreme Court prepared to 
constitutionalize de facto racial segregation would not necessarily 
balk at doing the same for gender hierarchy.207  
The real differences cases turn out to be a special case of 
contingent equal protection in which the structural inequality appears 
as the product of natural biology rather than human history. 
Understanding the shared doctrinal structure is important for two 
reasons. First, any doctrinal shift is unlikely to be confined to the 
context of K-12 integration, an effort that hardly needed the Supreme 
Court’s help to join the ranks of the nation’s neglected aspirations. 
Despite the claimed importance of context in equal protection 
analysis,208 doctrinal developments in one area eventually carry over 
into others.209 Second, understanding that the state interest in racial 
equality plays the same analytical role as the state interests in 
                                               
206
 See id. at 728-32. While Congress certainly had evidence of sex discrimination, 
including discrimination with respect to parental leave, the FMLA’s affirmative 
requirements for family and medical leave go well beyond remedying anything that 
the Court would have found to be unconstitutional sex discrimination. For further 
discussion of the relationship of contingent equal protection to Congress’s 
Section 5 power, see infra, part III.B.1. 
207The main reason one might expect them to balk is non-doctrinal and is that 
white male members of the Court may have greater empathy with, for example, the 
plight of professional women. See Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federaliam Case, 
Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CINN. L. REV. 365, 374-75 (2004) 
(describing Justice Rehnquist’s experiences caring for his wife when she was ill 
and helping his daughter, a lawyer and single mother, with child care). 
208
 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (“Context matters when 
reviewing race-based governmental action under the  Equal Protection Clause.”). 
209
 See Mayeri, supra note 3; Karlan, Small Numbers, supra note 2, at 1387. 
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Webster, CalFed, and Hibbs shows that rejecting equality as a 
compelling state interest would be an abrupt departure from existing 
law. 
3. Real Differences as Structural Inequality 
The analytical parallel between accommodating sex differences 
and correcting structural inequality is unsurprising. The problem in 
real differences cases is not a problem of women’s natural and 
inherent disadvantage but a problem of structural features of society 
that are premised on a male norm.210 Social mechanisms reproduce 
that structure together with the reproduction of racial hierarchy. For 
example, existing demand for workers who are free of caretaking 
responsibilities is premised on the social fact of gender hierarchy. 
The same is true of the pregnancy exclusion in Geduldig. Sex 
difference is the material basis for women’s subordination, so it is 
not surprising that these “real” differences play the same role in 
contingent equal protection as structural inequality. The problem that 
presents as women’s difference is in fact the social structure that 
makes that difference problematic.   
At the same time, the apparent naturalness of sex differences 
can give greater force to claims for substantive equality. The 
persistent effects of structural racism are often dismissed as personal 
or cultural failures. Although similar claims are also made about 
women’s choices or propensities, it is hard to deny that, say, lack of 
pregnancy leave means that women’s economic opportunities are, on 
the whole, constrained in a way that men’s are not. The obviousness 
of this fact is illustrated by the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist—
generally no friend to feminist claims—wrote the sweeping opinion 
in Hibbs upholding the FMLA as a matter of sex equality.211 The 
                                               
210
 But see Susan Brownmiller, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 
(1975) (“From the humblest beginnings of the social order based on a primitive 
system of retaliatory force … woman was unequal before the law. By anatomical 
fiat … the human male was a natural predator and the human female served as his 
natural prey.”). 
211
 See Williams, supra note 145, at 374-75 (“Justice Rehnquist … is not known as 
a feminist. Yet he has had ample opportunity to experience first-hand various kinds 
of family caretaking.”). 
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connection between claims of natural difference and structural 
inequality is even more obvious—and more likely to draw the 
sympathy of the Supreme Court—in the rare instance, discussed in 
Part III, where the perceived natural disadvantage falls on men.212 
Thus, while one wing of the Supreme Court seeks to use race cases 
to turn the Equal Protection Clause into a tool for entrenching 
inequality,213 sex difference cases point to the possibility of an Equal 
Protection Clause that promotes and perhaps even requires not just 
facially neutral treatment but affirmative equality. Part III outlines 
these two possible futures for contingent equal protection. 
III. The Future of Contingent Equal Protection 
Parents Involved exposed a fault line in equal protection 
doctrine. In affirmative action cases, the Court has loosely asserted 
that societal discrimination is not a compelling state interest.214 The 
Parents Involved plurality took that statement out of context and at 
face value. Fortunately, Justice Kennedy spun out the implications 
and distanced himself from the plurality’s project. The Court is thus 
narrowly divided over whether the government can even try to alter 
the status quo of racial hierarchy. 
Government efforts to reduce both racial and gender inequality 
fall under the analytic umbrella of contingent equal protection. 
Developments in one area will tend to affect the other. This Part 
explores potential consequences, depending on which way the split 
revealed in Parents Involved is resolved. Part III.A outlines the 
ramifications beyond school integration for the plurality’s vision of 
willful blindness to structural inequality. Part III.B sketches some 
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possibilities of the alternative path. Beyond just preserving the basic 
contingent equal protection that most people assumed was 
constitutional before Parents Involved, recognizing the state interest 
in equality would provide a structure for further pro-equality efforts, 
as well as the seeds for modest legislative and judicial protection of 
positive rights. 
A. Constitutionalizing the Status Quo: The Path of the 
Parents Involved Plurality 
The Parents Involved plurality would have held that racial 
integration of K-12 public schools was not a compelling state interest 
and was thus unconstitutional regardless of the means through which 
it was pursued. Radical enough in its own right, this ruling would 
have had far-reaching implications for both race and sex cases in the 
realm of contingent equal protection. 
 1. Perpetuating Racial Hierarchy 
The most immediate consequences of the plurality’s view are 
laid out in the record of Parents Involved. In the particular context of 
public schools, the difference between Justice Kennedy and the 
plurality was that Justice Kennedy would have allowed race-
conscious measures to promote integration without individual 
classification of students. The consequences of the position 
ultimately taken by the plurality were clearly exposed and explored 
during oral argument. At the K-12 level, the plurality’s approach 
would invalidate the entire spectrum of site selection, magnet, and 
voluntary transfer programs that schools have developed to strive for 
racial integration in the post-Brown era. Higher education admissions 
program of the kind proposed in Justice Thomas’s Grutter dissent 
would be similarly doomed. 
Ironically, it was Justice Scalia who led the charge at oral 
argument for distinguishing between a race-conscious state interest 
and racial classification of individuals.215 Justice Kennedy and the 
ultimate dissenters asked whether it made sense to say that 
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integration was an appropriate goal but then prevent the state from 
using the most obvious means for achieving it.216 Echoing the debate 
in Grutter and Gratz over holistic versus transparent evaluations, this 
argument overlooked the problematic nature of racial classification 
itself. Justice Kennedy, it seems, was persuaded by Justice Scalia’s 
arguments that the state interest could be preserved but the 
classifications should be rejected. Justice Scalia himself inexplicably 
joined the plurality’s embrace of the plaintiffs’ extreme position and 
gratuitously expanded on it in his Ricci concurrence. That position 
would render unconstitutional all conscious efforts by state actors to 
achieve racially integrated schools. The only exception would be 
when the state could establish the affirmative defense that it would 
have taken the same action even if race had not been a factor. 
As Justice Scalia ‘s opinion in Ricci showed,this reasoning need 
not stop with preventing the conscious integration of schools. In 
some ways, the concept of integration can be distinguished from the 
concept of equality. Much of our nation’s  history can be understood 
as suggesting that the two go together, but people of good faith 
debate whether and when separation might be a better path to 
equality. At the level of the Court’s analysis, however, virtually any 
question of state-desired equality can be analogized to a question of 
integration. “Integration,” meaning diversity in the schools, is not all 
that different from integration or diversity in workplaces, particular 
professions, representative bodies, or even economic classes. The 
Court has already suggested that low minority participation in a 
particular profession should be interpreted not as a symptom of 
persisting inequality but as a reflection of cultural or ethnic 
preference.217 An expressed desire to improve the relative status of a 
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particular racial group could easily become grounds for striking 
down state action taken on that basis. The path of the Parents 
Involved plurality could thus lead quite easily and predictably to a 
racial version of Lochner, in which, in a final irony of the disparate 
impact doctrine, any intentional governmental interference with the 
racial status quo is deemed a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Some of this ground has already been scouted. Professor Forde-
Mazrui’s early insight into the potential vulnerability of race-neutral 
affirmative action has already been borne out by the Parents 
Involved plurality opinion. Similarly, in 2003 Richard Primus 
described (but, like Forde-Mazrui, did not advocate) how the Equal 
Protection Clause could be used to attack Title VII disparate impact 
rules.218 Like alternative action, they could be deemed 
unconstitutional for taking race into account. Justice Scalia relied on 
Primus’s article for his Ricci concurrence,219 although he omitted 
Primus’s conclusion that “only a very uncompromising court” would 
take colorblindness that far.220 A plurality, however, appears to be 
willing. Moreover, the Supreme Court will not be the first to 
consider such a challenge: Opponents of affirmative action are 
already preparing to attack race-neutral alternative action in states 
that have banned “racial preferences” by statute.221 If successful, 
such a case would be the first use of disparate impact doctrine to 
strike down a facially neutral policy aimed at promoting equality, 
setting the stage for this new doctrinal twist to expand to its logical 
limits, unless and until it is overhauled by the Supreme Court. 222 
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 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note __ (advocating state constitutional challenges 
to race-neutral affirmative action at universities in Michigan and Texas). 
222
 For a survey of those logical limits, see Crenshaw, supra note 50, at 126 (“They 
should not be surprised to find challenges to ethnic and women’s studies programs, 
identity-based student organizations, ethnic alumni associations, outreach and 
noticing requirements, and even breast cancer screenings and domestic violence 
  
 
 
  CONTINGENT EQUAL PROTECTION 54 
 
DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE 
 
 
 2. Perpetuating Gender Hierarchy 
Harder to predict is how the elimination of contingent equal 
protection for racial inequality would affect government efforts to 
promote sex equality. One aim of this Article is to help forestall the 
retrenchment of racial hierarchy implicit in the Parents Involved 
plurality opinion by pointing out the logical implications not just for 
race but also for gender. Although they could be distinguished on the 
basis of the differing standards of review, that distinction is not 
warranted on the question of whether equality is a legitimate state 
interest. Once the racial status quo becomes constitutionalized, there 
is little to stop the same from happening with gender. 
For example, the Supreme Court could well find itself persuaded 
that Geduldig was wrong, and that a pregnancy classification is, after 
all, a sex classification. That would mean that pure pregnancy 
discrimination—e.g., firing an employee who becomes pregnant—
would be unconstitutional when practiced by a state employer. But it 
would also provide a constitutional basis for overruling CalFed. The 
Court has already co-opted a liberal rhetoric of colorblindness to 
oppose affirmative action.223 Co-opting liberal arguments that sex 
classifications should receive nearly-strict scrutiny and that Geduldig 
was wrongly decided, a Court following the logic of the Parents 
Involved plurality could easily strike down California’s maternity 
leave statute as wrongly conferring “special rights.”224 
Even if well-established precedent and practices were preserved, 
cutting back on contingent equal protection could prevent the 
flourishing of more recent efforts toward substantive equality. For 
                                                                                                            
shelters as forms of preference.”). For initial confirmation of these predictions, see 
Corey Kilgannon, Lawyer Files Antifeminist Suit Against Columbia, N.Y. TIMES 
CITY ROOM, Aug. 18, 2008, available at 
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example, recent medical emphasis on the importance of 
breastfeeding has led to a wave of disputes over whether employers 
should allow breaks for women to express milk, or whether 
childbirth-related leave should be extended when there is difficulty 
establishing milk flow. Federal courts generally have been hostile to 
employees who pursue such questions under Title VII and the PDA. 
For example, in a passage eerily reminiscent of Geduldig’s “pregnant 
women and nonpregnant persons,” one federal court held that a 
breastfeeding woman was not “affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions” as required by the PDA.225 The court 
therefore granted a motion to dismiss her claim that she was denied 
breaks to express milk while others were allowed to take similar 
breaks to smoke.226 In other words, there was no entitlement to 
judicial intervention to level the playing field along this particular 
axis. 
Non-judicial actors in several states have taken the opposite 
view. Recently enacted legislation in Oregon requires employers to 
accommodate breastfeeding where reasonably possible.227 Some 
state agencies have taken the position that failure to reasonably 
accommodate breastfeeding is sex discrimination under state law.228 
The federal EEOC is considering a similar approach. 
The breastfeeding dispute is thus shaping up to be a reprise of 
Geduldig and the PDA, with the federal courts taking a narrow view 
of equality and everyone else taking a broader view. Contingent 
equal protection would allow the states to enact that broader view in 
order to promote substantive equality for women. Without equality 
as a legitimate, important state interest, however, laws for 
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accommodating breastfeeding are, like race-neutral affirmative 
action, vulnerable under disparate impact doctrine. 
Some remedies for sex discrimination might be justified by state 
interests other than equality. For example, accommodation of 
breastfeeding might be justified as a health measure. However, 
human rights advocates have increasingly recognized the importance 
of seeking substantive sex equality through measures designed to 
improve the status of “women who encounter multiple forms of 
discrimination,” including race discrimination.229 Under current 
doctrine, a policy that took both race and sex into account would be 
analyzed twice: once as a sex classification, once as a race 
classification. Because the level of scrutiny is higher for race 
classifications, that standard would effectively control. Measures 
aimed at improving the worst instances of structural inequality would 
thus be among the most vulnerable to constitutional attack. 
B. Contingent Equal Protection and the Seeds of Positive 
Equality 
In the hope that the Parents Involved plurality will not become a 
majority, this section considers the possibility of a path in the 
opposite direction. A standard critique of the Supreme Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence is that its disparate impact and real 
differences cases reflect willful blindness to serious race and gender 
subordination,230 from Washington v. Davis to McKleskey v. 
Kemp,231 and from Feeney to Geduldig. The concept of contingent 
equal protection gives a name and structure to the small silver lining, 
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that at least the Court has left some space for benign state action 
against race and gender subordination. Explicit recognition of the 
state interest in equality would assure the constitutionality of state 
efforts to eliminate structural inequality. It would also provide an 
opportunity to revisit the scope of federal power to promote equality 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, contingent 
equal protection could provide a basis for establishing a 
governmental obligation to overcome existing inequality in at least 
some contexts. 
1. Implications for Legislative Power 
State legislatures have plenary police power and may enact laws 
to promote equality as long as equality is a legitimate state interest. 
Congress, however, must act pursuant to an enumerated power. 
Explicit recognition of a state interest in equality would raise the 
question whether Congress may enact legislation on that same basis. 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers on Congress 
the power to enforce the Amendment, including the Equal Protection 
Clause. Although the framers expected Section 5 to be the primary 
means of enforcement, Congress’s power went largely unused while 
the Supreme Court took over the task of interpreting and enforcing 
the Fourteenth Amendment.232 Congress later relied on its power 
over interstate commerce to enact civil rights legislation.233 Recently, 
however, the Court decided that civil rights laws could not be fully 
enforced against the states if they were based solely on the 
commerce power. Congress needed Section 5.234 
At the same time, the Supreme Court began to construe the 
Section 5 power narrowly. In most cases, it demanded that Congress 
limit its efforts to combating unequal treatment that was illegal under 
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the Court’s own precedents. As the Court saw it, anything else was 
unauthorized expansion of the Equal Protection Clause. On this 
basis, the Court struck down the civil rights remedy of the Violence 
Against Women Act and limited the scope of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.235 
One notable aberration in this line of cases is the Court’s 
decision to uphold the FMLA.236 As discussed above, that decision is 
hard to square with the Court’s other pronouncements about 
Section 5.237 Another aberration is disparate impact doctrine. The 
Court has arguably been moving toward allowing Congress greater 
leeway when it uses Section 5 to redress discrimination on the basis 
of suspect characteristics, like race and sex.239 That would explain 
the contrast between the Court’s deference to the FMLA and 
Title VII and its lack of deference to the ADA and ADEA. Justice 
Scalia’s Ricci concurrence, by contrast, positions the Equal 
Protection Clause itself as directly opposed to Congress’s power to 
reduce structural inequality. 
Criticisms of the Court’s recent Section 5 jurisprudence are 
many. For purposes of this Article it is sufficient to note that the 
concept of contingent equal protection provides a foundation for 
expanding Section 5 powers without letting them run rampant in the 
style of the commerce power. The same interest in structural 
inequality that justifies race- or sex-conscious legislation by states 
could also mark the scope of Congress’s Section 5 power.240  This 
                                               
235
 See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil rights 
remedy of the Violence Against Women Act); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Section 5 did not include the power to outlaw 
disability discrimination in state employment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000) (same for age discrimination). 
236
 See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
237
 See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (discussing the implausibility of 
the reasoning in Nevada v. Hibbs). 
239
 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735. 
240
 This approach would be consistent with most of the outcomes in the Section 5 
cases since Boerne, including the distinction between race and sex cases—where 
Congress’s power appears to be broader—and cases involving other 
characteristics, such as age or disability—where Congress’s power appears to be 
  
 
 
  CONTINGENT EQUAL PROTECTION 59 
 
DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE 
 
 
would give Congress the same authority as states to seek substantive 
equality in the face of de facto inequality and sex differences. 
2. The Road Less Travelled: Positive Protection of Equal 
Access to Fundamental Rights 
In all of the contexts discussed so far, contingent equal 
protection has been characterized by government choice, rather than 
obligation, to redress inequality. That choice ultimately derives from 
the state action doctrine. The state action doctrine makes the 
government accountable only for harms linked through a tight chain 
of causation to specific, illegal acts of discrimination by the 
government. Everything else is societal discrimination or structural 
inequality. When the purportedly natural workings of society result 
in inequality, the government may choose whether to act as a 
counter-weight. The difficulty of establishing an affirmative right to 
government help is that government is not required to act without 
proof of fault and causation. Equal protection is a restraint, not a 
prod.  
In one context, however, the Supreme Court has restrained the 
government in a way that required accommodation of biological 
inequality. The “real differences” cases discussed above included 
sexual vulnerability, work and family, and military combat, all of 
which put women at a disadvantage relative to men. In a series of 
cases about the parental rights of unwed fathers, however, the Court 
for the first and only time required accommodation of a biological 
difference, rather than leaving the matter to legislative discretion.241  
The unwed father cases involved a series of challenges to state 
laws that treated the mother but not the father as the legal parent of a 
child born outside of marriage.242 The Court started with the 
assumption that the biological mother’s parental rights were 
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established by the birth of the child.243 The Court also accepted the 
state’s argument that biological fathers were not similarly situated to 
biological mothers: biological maternity implied a caretaking 
relationship to the child, which is not part of biological paternity.244 
Men were thus at a biological disadvantage when it came to parental 
rights.245 By analogy to cases such as Geduldig, where women were 
biologically disadvantaged in the workplace, the conclusion should 
have been that the state could choose whether to accommodate 
men’s disadvantage by giving them parental rights. 
The Court, however, did not end its analysis with the 
observation that women and men are not similarly situated and 
therefore need not be treated the same. Instead, having identified a 
relevant biological difference between the sexes, the Court took 
another step: it used motherhood as the model for crafting a 
“biology-plus-relationship” test to accommodate fathers’ physical 
disadvantage. As the Court later explained, it makes sense to allow a 
man to acquire parental rights comparable to a mother’s by creating 
a test “in terms the male can fulfill.”246 Men’s biological 
disadvantage thus served not as a justification for different legal 
treatment but as the impetus for devising a legal standard that fairly 
accommodated their disadvantage. Parental rights, the one area of 
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law in which men’s biology rather than women’s is a disadvantage, 
is also the one area in which the Supreme Court has adopted a 
flexible, accommodating theory of sex equality as a matter of 
constitutional command, not just governmental choice. 
The fathers’ rights cases, understood in the broader context of 
contingent equal protection, provide a basis for finding some 
affirmative rights to accommodation and substantive equality in the 
Equal Protection Clause. Constitutional lawyers and theorists have 
tried many strategies over time for trying to find affirmative human 
rights in our Constitution: subsistence, equality, health care. These 
efforts have floundered on the libertarian and property-protective 
nature of the Constitution. Contingent equal protection does not 
provide a way around that roadblock. It does, however, shine light on 
the tension in the Supreme Court’s dominant narrative of negative 
equality, and the light reveals a few cracks. 
One such crack is the equality rhetoric about abortion. Although 
the abortion right is formally deemed a matter of liberty under the 
Due Process Clause, many commentators and even the Court have 
suggested that the right has an equality component as well.247 The 
problem with such arguments is that they assume a governmental 
duty to accommodate de facto inequality. For example, some have 
argued that women have a right to abortion because women are 
disproportionately and discriminatorily saddled with responsibility 
for rearing children.248 That discrimination, however, is not 
attributable to the government under the state action doctrine. As we 
have seen, the existing inequality in biology and in social 
circumstances typically means that the government may choose 
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whether to level the playing field by, say, giving women access to 
abortion. 
The fathers’ rights cases, however, suggest a different approach. 
The abortion right is closely related to the right at stake in those 
cases, since it involves the parent-child relationship as well as bodily 
integrity.249 In the fatherhood cases, the state was required to 
accommodate biological sex inequality when it acted to deny 
putative fathers of their liberty interest in the parent-child 
relationship.  When the state restricts abortion, it also denies a liberty 
interest, and might similarly be required to accommodate de facto 
inequality.250 
Conclusion 
Contingent equal protection has been implicit in several of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions upholding remedial programs. It also 
underlay the assumption that race-neutral affirmative action was 
available when the courts restricted traditional programs. That 
consistent acknowledgement that the state has a compelling interest 
in equality should not be overshadowed by the Court’s dismissal of 
“societal discrimination” as a basis for certain kinds of state action. 
The Court should explicitly recognize that both state and federal 
governments are empowered to strive for the elimination of 
structural inequalities. Doing so would produce a more consistent 
and appropriate relationship among the Equal Protection Clause, 
disparate impact doctrine, and Section 5. It may also provide a 
foundation for modest development of affirmative governmental 
obligation to redress inequality. 
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